海德格尔基本本体论中现象学经验概念的问题化与修正

Vlada Anuchina
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文的目的是证明马丁·海德格尔的“在”概念是对埃德蒙·胡塞尔的“经验”概念的再认识和修正。分析的主题是海德格尔的概念“此在”,这是海德格尔整个遗产中最有问题的概念之一,由于其意义的模糊性和由此产生的可能解释的可变性。特别注意考察海德格尔哲学的本体论解读,而不是存在主义和人类学的解读;作者还从文本上论证了其合法性。作者从文本上证明了此在确实是胡塞尔经验概念的修正。此外,她声称,不仅在此的概念,而且基本本体论本身在某种程度上可以被视为胡塞尔现象学的原始修正。因为不仅现象学的一个关键概念得到了修改,而且它的探索方法和一些关键主题(如意识的时间性)也得到了修改,并纳入了海德格尔的基本本体论计划。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Problematization and modification of phenomenological concept of experience in Martin Heidegger`s fundamental ontology
The aim of the paper is to justify the view of Martin Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as a recon- ceptualization and modification of Edmund Husserl’s concept of experience (Erfahrung). The subject of analysis is Heidegger's concept “Dasein”, which is one of the most problematic concepts of the entire Heidegger's legacy due to ambiguity of its meaning and the resulting variability of possible interpretations. Specific attention is paid to examining the ontological reading of Heidegger's philosophy as opposed to both existentialist and anthropological ones; the author also textually argues for its legitimacy. Author textually proves that Dasein indeed is a modification of Husserl`s concept of experience. Moreover, she claims that not only the concept of Dasein but fundamental ontology itself may be seen to some extent as an original modification of Husserl’s phenomenology. For not only one of the key phenomenological concepts gets modified, but also its method of exploration and some crucial topics (e. g. the temporality of consciousness) get modified and incorporated in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology project.
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