{"title":"海德格尔基本本体论中现象学经验概念的问题化与修正","authors":"Vlada Anuchina","doi":"10.15407/fd2021.03.138","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The aim of the paper is to justify the view of Martin Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as a recon- ceptualization and modification of Edmund Husserl’s concept of experience (Erfahrung). The subject of analysis is Heidegger's concept “Dasein”, which is one of the most problematic concepts of the entire Heidegger's legacy due to ambiguity of its meaning and the resulting variability of possible interpretations. Specific attention is paid to examining the ontological reading of Heidegger's philosophy as opposed to both existentialist and anthropological ones; the author also textually argues for its legitimacy. Author textually proves that Dasein indeed is a modification of Husserl`s concept of experience. Moreover, she claims that not only the concept of Dasein but fundamental ontology itself may be seen to some extent as an original modification of Husserl’s phenomenology. For not only one of the key phenomenological concepts gets modified, but also its method of exploration and some crucial topics (e. g. the temporality of consciousness) get modified and incorporated in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology project.","PeriodicalId":315902,"journal":{"name":"Filosofska dumka (Philosophical Thought)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Problematization and modification of phenomenological concept of experience in Martin Heidegger`s fundamental ontology\",\"authors\":\"Vlada Anuchina\",\"doi\":\"10.15407/fd2021.03.138\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The aim of the paper is to justify the view of Martin Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as a recon- ceptualization and modification of Edmund Husserl’s concept of experience (Erfahrung). The subject of analysis is Heidegger's concept “Dasein”, which is one of the most problematic concepts of the entire Heidegger's legacy due to ambiguity of its meaning and the resulting variability of possible interpretations. Specific attention is paid to examining the ontological reading of Heidegger's philosophy as opposed to both existentialist and anthropological ones; the author also textually argues for its legitimacy. Author textually proves that Dasein indeed is a modification of Husserl`s concept of experience. Moreover, she claims that not only the concept of Dasein but fundamental ontology itself may be seen to some extent as an original modification of Husserl’s phenomenology. For not only one of the key phenomenological concepts gets modified, but also its method of exploration and some crucial topics (e. g. the temporality of consciousness) get modified and incorporated in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology project.\",\"PeriodicalId\":315902,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Filosofska dumka (Philosophical Thought)\",\"volume\":\"4 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-09-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Filosofska dumka (Philosophical Thought)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.15407/fd2021.03.138\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Filosofska dumka (Philosophical Thought)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15407/fd2021.03.138","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Problematization and modification of phenomenological concept of experience in Martin Heidegger`s fundamental ontology
The aim of the paper is to justify the view of Martin Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as a recon- ceptualization and modification of Edmund Husserl’s concept of experience (Erfahrung). The subject of analysis is Heidegger's concept “Dasein”, which is one of the most problematic concepts of the entire Heidegger's legacy due to ambiguity of its meaning and the resulting variability of possible interpretations. Specific attention is paid to examining the ontological reading of Heidegger's philosophy as opposed to both existentialist and anthropological ones; the author also textually argues for its legitimacy. Author textually proves that Dasein indeed is a modification of Husserl`s concept of experience. Moreover, she claims that not only the concept of Dasein but fundamental ontology itself may be seen to some extent as an original modification of Husserl’s phenomenology. For not only one of the key phenomenological concepts gets modified, but also its method of exploration and some crucial topics (e. g. the temporality of consciousness) get modified and incorporated in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology project.