修正暴动:恢复暴动法中的权力平衡

J. S. Campbell
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引用次数: 0

摘要

《反叛乱法》允许总统在国内部署和利用联邦常备军和州民兵来执行通常由国内执法部门执行的职能。当情况使通过正常手段执行国内法变得不切实际时,当法律的执行受到阻碍以至于剥夺了公民的合法法律保护时,或者应国家的要求,总统可以援引该法案。根据该法案的现行版本,总统拥有唯一和绝对的自由裁量权,可以决定在上述两种情况下何时援引该法案。当被援引时,该法案为总统提供了广泛而基本上不明确的行动权力。这篇评论回顾了起义法通过背后的历史,并跟随后来对当代版本的修订。它认为,国会和最高法院未能对总统的国内军事权力提供充分的制约,未能确定这种权力的来源,也未能准确描述该法规定的总统权力的限制。由于未能坚持国父们设想的军事介入国内执法的概念,这个国家很容易受到为了权宜之计而严重滥用权力的影响。这表明,在不降低《平乱法》的实用性的前提下,恢复对总统权力的制约,可以消除总统滥用职权的可能性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Amending Insurrection: Restoring the Balance of Power in The Insurrection Act
The Insurrection Act allows the president to domestically deploy and utilize the federal standing army and state militias to perform functions normally performed by domestic law enforcement. The president can invoke the Act when circumstances make it impracticable to enforce domestic law by normal means, when the execution of the law is obstructed such that it deprives citizens of rightful legal protections, or upon the request of a state. Under the current version of the Act, the president possesses the sole and absolute discretion to determine when it is invoked during the two former instances above. When invoked, the Act provides broad and largely undefined authority for the president to act. This Comment reviews the history behind the passage of the Insurrection Act and follows the subsequent amendments to the contemporary version. It argues that Congress and the Supreme Court have failed to provide adequate checks on the president’s domestic military power, to determine the source of this power, and to accurately describe the limits of the president’s power under the Act. By failing to adhere to the conception of military involvement in domestic law enforcement that the Founders envisioned, the nation is left vulnerable to serious abuses of power for the sake of expediency. This Comment shows that restoring checks on the president’s power under the Insurrection Act will eliminate the possibility of presidential abuse without reducing the usefulness of the Act.
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