{"title":"美联储的市政流动性工具:现在和未来的可能性和必要性","authors":"R. Hockett","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3597732","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Fed's new Community QE Facility, which is unprecedented in Fed history, will function as a literal lifeline to States and their Subdivisions. But it remains, precisely because of its novelty, unfamiliar and possibly even off-putting or intimidating to many State and City financial officers, not to mention Mayors, Governors, City Councils and State Legislatures. It also continues to fall short of what will be required if our States, our Cities, and our federal polity itself, which the present White House occupancy is doing virtually nothing to assist, are to survive the present pandemic. \n \nContinuing unfamiliarity on the part of State and City officials with Community QE raises the danger that those in serious need of funding to address the present pandemic will not seek or receive it. It also diminishes the likelihood that City and State officials will press the Fed to do a further easing of terms – and this form of pressure will be critical if the Facility is to do all that it’s meant to do. \n \nThis Memorandum is meant to solve those two problems. It first briefly summarizes what the newly eased MLF enables now. It then addresses what the new Facility probably will, and, at least as importantly, must enable in future. The Memorandum then closes with an updated three-phase ‘Game Plan’ for States and Cities to put into operation the moment the Fed makes clear that the MLF is not a mere ‘virtue signal,’ but a sincere offer of badly needed funding – by actually beginning to provide funding.","PeriodicalId":145273,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Fed’s Municipal Liquidity Facility: Present & Future Possibilities & Necessities\",\"authors\":\"R. Hockett\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3597732\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The Fed's new Community QE Facility, which is unprecedented in Fed history, will function as a literal lifeline to States and their Subdivisions. But it remains, precisely because of its novelty, unfamiliar and possibly even off-putting or intimidating to many State and City financial officers, not to mention Mayors, Governors, City Councils and State Legislatures. It also continues to fall short of what will be required if our States, our Cities, and our federal polity itself, which the present White House occupancy is doing virtually nothing to assist, are to survive the present pandemic. \\n \\nContinuing unfamiliarity on the part of State and City officials with Community QE raises the danger that those in serious need of funding to address the present pandemic will not seek or receive it. It also diminishes the likelihood that City and State officials will press the Fed to do a further easing of terms – and this form of pressure will be critical if the Facility is to do all that it’s meant to do. \\n \\nThis Memorandum is meant to solve those two problems. It first briefly summarizes what the newly eased MLF enables now. It then addresses what the new Facility probably will, and, at least as importantly, must enable in future. The Memorandum then closes with an updated three-phase ‘Game Plan’ for States and Cities to put into operation the moment the Fed makes clear that the MLF is not a mere ‘virtue signal,’ but a sincere offer of badly needed funding – by actually beginning to provide funding.\",\"PeriodicalId\":145273,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal\",\"volume\":\"5 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-05-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3597732\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3597732","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
美联储新的社区量化宽松机制(Community QE Facility)在美联储历史上是前所未有的,它将成为各州及其分支机构的生命线。但它仍然存在,正是因为它的新奇、陌生,甚至可能让许多州和市的财政官员感到不快或害怕,更不用说市长、州长、市议会和州立法机构了。如果我们的各州、我们的城市和我们的联邦政策本身要在目前的大流行病中生存下来,它也继续达不到所需的水平,而目前白宫的入住几乎没有为这些政策提供任何帮助。州和市官员对社区量化宽松的持续不熟悉,增加了那些严重需要资金来应对当前大流行的人不会寻求或接受资金的危险。这也降低了市政府和州政府官员向美联储施压,要求其进一步放宽贷款条件的可能性——如果该机构想要实现其目标,这种形式的压力将是至关重要的。本备忘录旨在解决这两个问题。本文首先简要总结了新放宽的MLF现在可以实现的功能。然后,它阐述了新基金可能会做什么,以及至少同样重要的是,必须在未来实现什么。备忘录最后以一个更新的三阶段“游戏计划”结束,当美联储明确表示,MLF不仅仅是一个“美德信号”,而是通过实际开始提供资金来真诚地提供急需的资金时,各州和各城市就可以实施该计划。
The Fed’s Municipal Liquidity Facility: Present & Future Possibilities & Necessities
The Fed's new Community QE Facility, which is unprecedented in Fed history, will function as a literal lifeline to States and their Subdivisions. But it remains, precisely because of its novelty, unfamiliar and possibly even off-putting or intimidating to many State and City financial officers, not to mention Mayors, Governors, City Councils and State Legislatures. It also continues to fall short of what will be required if our States, our Cities, and our federal polity itself, which the present White House occupancy is doing virtually nothing to assist, are to survive the present pandemic.
Continuing unfamiliarity on the part of State and City officials with Community QE raises the danger that those in serious need of funding to address the present pandemic will not seek or receive it. It also diminishes the likelihood that City and State officials will press the Fed to do a further easing of terms – and this form of pressure will be critical if the Facility is to do all that it’s meant to do.
This Memorandum is meant to solve those two problems. It first briefly summarizes what the newly eased MLF enables now. It then addresses what the new Facility probably will, and, at least as importantly, must enable in future. The Memorandum then closes with an updated three-phase ‘Game Plan’ for States and Cities to put into operation the moment the Fed makes clear that the MLF is not a mere ‘virtue signal,’ but a sincere offer of badly needed funding – by actually beginning to provide funding.