{"title":"基于ea的粗粒度可重构阵列NoC硬件木马攻击缓解","authors":"Zeyu Li, Junjie Wang, Zhao Huang, Quan Wang","doi":"10.1109/NaNA56854.2022.00097","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Coarse-Grained Reconfigurable Arrays (CGRA) im-plemented using FPGA are widely applied due to the portability and compatibility. As an evolvable hardware (EHW) platform, it also faces hardware security problems, among which hardware Trojans (HTs) is the most prominent threat. HTs are malicious hardware components. Once implanted in the route units (RUs) of the network-on-chip (NoC) in CGRA, it will leak confidential information or destroy the entire system. However, few studies have focused on HT mitigation in RUs of NoC in CGRA. To this end, we present an evolutionary algorithm (EA)-based method to mitigate HT attacks in NoC of CGRA. Specifically, we employ the EA to explore generating the circuit structures that do not contain HT-infected RUs. In the simulation experiments built using Python, this paper reports the experimental results for two target evolutionary circuits in NoC and outlines the effectiveness of the proposed method.","PeriodicalId":113743,"journal":{"name":"2022 International Conference on Networking and Network Applications (NaNA)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"EA-based Mitigation of Hardware Trojan Attacks in NoC of Coarse-Grained Reconfigurable Arrays\",\"authors\":\"Zeyu Li, Junjie Wang, Zhao Huang, Quan Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/NaNA56854.2022.00097\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Coarse-Grained Reconfigurable Arrays (CGRA) im-plemented using FPGA are widely applied due to the portability and compatibility. As an evolvable hardware (EHW) platform, it also faces hardware security problems, among which hardware Trojans (HTs) is the most prominent threat. HTs are malicious hardware components. Once implanted in the route units (RUs) of the network-on-chip (NoC) in CGRA, it will leak confidential information or destroy the entire system. However, few studies have focused on HT mitigation in RUs of NoC in CGRA. To this end, we present an evolutionary algorithm (EA)-based method to mitigate HT attacks in NoC of CGRA. Specifically, we employ the EA to explore generating the circuit structures that do not contain HT-infected RUs. In the simulation experiments built using Python, this paper reports the experimental results for two target evolutionary circuits in NoC and outlines the effectiveness of the proposed method.\",\"PeriodicalId\":113743,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2022 International Conference on Networking and Network Applications (NaNA)\",\"volume\":\"37 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2022 International Conference on Networking and Network Applications (NaNA)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/NaNA56854.2022.00097\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2022 International Conference on Networking and Network Applications (NaNA)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/NaNA56854.2022.00097","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
用FPGA实现的粗粒度可重构阵列(CGRA)由于其可移植性和兼容性得到了广泛的应用。作为一个进化硬件平台,它也面临着硬件安全问题,其中硬件木马(ht)是最突出的威胁。ht是恶意硬件组件。一旦植入到CGRA的片上网络路由单元(route unit, ru)中,就会泄露机密信息或破坏整个系统。然而,很少有研究关注高温缓解CGRA中NoC的RUs。为此,我们提出了一种基于进化算法(EA)的方法来缓解CGRA NoC中的HT攻击。具体来说,我们使用EA来探索生成不包含ht感染RUs的电路结构。在Python构建的仿真实验中,报告了NoC中两个目标进化电路的实验结果,并概述了所提方法的有效性。
EA-based Mitigation of Hardware Trojan Attacks in NoC of Coarse-Grained Reconfigurable Arrays
Coarse-Grained Reconfigurable Arrays (CGRA) im-plemented using FPGA are widely applied due to the portability and compatibility. As an evolvable hardware (EHW) platform, it also faces hardware security problems, among which hardware Trojans (HTs) is the most prominent threat. HTs are malicious hardware components. Once implanted in the route units (RUs) of the network-on-chip (NoC) in CGRA, it will leak confidential information or destroy the entire system. However, few studies have focused on HT mitigation in RUs of NoC in CGRA. To this end, we present an evolutionary algorithm (EA)-based method to mitigate HT attacks in NoC of CGRA. Specifically, we employ the EA to explore generating the circuit structures that do not contain HT-infected RUs. In the simulation experiments built using Python, this paper reports the experimental results for two target evolutionary circuits in NoC and outlines the effectiveness of the proposed method.