智能电网中同步相子技术的网络物理攻击与防御演示

Rafiullah Khan, K. Mclaughlin, John Hastings, D. Laverty, S. Sezer
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引用次数: 15

摘要

智能电网采用同步相量技术进行实时控制和监测。先前的文献工作发现了IEEE C37.118.2同步量通信标准中的关键漏洞。为了保护基于同步量的系统,隐形的网络攻击和有效的防御机制仍然需要研究。本文研究了攻击者如何开发一种自定义工具来执行针对同步设备的隐身中间人攻击。特别是,四种不同类型的攻击能力已经在实验室的一个真实的基于同步孤岛的测试平台上进行了演示:(i)命令注入攻击,(ii)丢包攻击,(iii)重放攻击和(iv)隐形数据操纵攻击。基于对攻击能力和潜在物理影响的深刻技术理解,本文还根据NIST的建议开发并测试了分布式入侵检测系统(IDS)。所提出的入侵检测系统的功能已经在检测上述网络攻击的测试平台上得到了验证。本文认为,具有分散决策能力和学习系统行为能力的分布式入侵检测系统可以有效检测隐身恶意活动,提高同步性网络的安全性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Demonstrating Cyber-Physical Attacks and Defense for Synchrophasor Technology in Smart Grid
Synchrophasor technology is used for real-time control and monitoring in smart grid. Previous works in literature identified critical vulnerabilities in IEEE C37.118.2 synchrophasor communication standard. To protect synchrophasor-based systems, stealthy cyber-attacks and effective defense mechanisms still need to be investigated.This paper investigates how an attacker can develop a custom tool to execute stealthy man-in-the-middle attacks against synchrophasor devices. In particular, four different types of attack capabilities have been demonstrated in a real synchrophasorbased synchronous islanding testbed in laboratory: (i) command injection attack, (ii) packet drop attack, (iii) replay attack and (iv) stealthy data manipulation attack. With deep technical understanding of the attack capabilities and potential physical impacts, this paper also develops and tests a distributed Intrusion Detection System (IDS) following NIST recommendations. The functionalities of the proposed IDS have been validated in the testbed for detecting aforementioned cyber-attacks. The paper identified that a distributed IDS with decentralized decision making capability and the ability to learn system behavior could effectively detect stealthy malicious activities and improve synchrophasor network security.
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