用于评估传感器数据完整性的芯片级安全框架:正在进行的工作

Taimour Wehbe, V. Mooney, D. Keezer
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引用次数: 0

摘要

构成物联网基础的传感器节点的互联性不断增加,导致攻击者可以利用新的攻击途径恶意修改这些节点捕获的数据。在这项工作中,我们提出了一个框架,用于检测恶意硬件更改,试图攻击形成这些传感器节点的最先进的微芯片。具体来说,我们关注的是非常小的硬件木马(ht),当数据在不受信任的设施中制造的最先进的芯片上接收时,它们会试图立即修改传感器数据。我们提出了一种双芯片方法,由一个不受信任的最先进的证明者芯片和一个受信任的验证者芯片组成,其中验证者在运行时不断挑战证明者,以确保正确的操作并评估捕获数据的完整性。我们对提议机制的初步分析表明,在不受信任的最先进芯片上的任何地方都可以检测到高温攻击,并标记防止恶意更改的数据从传感器节点传输出来。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A chip-level security framework for assessing sensor data integrity: work-in-progress
The continuously increasing inter-connectivity of sensor nodes that form the basis of the Internet-of-Things results in new avenues of attack exploitable by adversaries to maliciously modify data captured by these nodes. In this work, we present a framework for detecting malicious hardware alterations that attempt to attack state-of-the-art microchips that form these sensor nodes. Specifically, we focus on extremely small Hardware Trojans (HTs) that attempt to modify sensor data right away as the data is received on a state-of-the-art chip fabricated in an untrusted facility. We present a dual-chip approach composed of an untrusted state-of-the-art prover chip and a trusted verifier chip, where the verifier continuously challenges the prover at run-time to ensure correct operation and assess the integrity of the captured data. Our preliminary analysis of the proposed mechanism shows that HT attacks anywhere on the untrusted state-of-the-art chip are detected and flagged preventing maliciously altered data to be transmitted out of the sensor node.
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