通过抽象为安全类型验证安全策略的一致性

K. Ono, Yuichi Nakamura, Fumiko Satoh, T. Tateishi
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引用次数: 13

摘要

面向服务的体系结构(SOA)使应用程序开发更容易,因为应用程序可以使用自底向上的方法从现有服务构建。但是,很难确定是否可以从现有服务构建所需的新服务。不仅要验证现有服务的功能一致性,还要验证其非功能(如安全性)方面的一致性。消息保护是安全性的一个方面。每个服务都需要一个适当的安全策略来定义对服务各方之间交换的消息的保护。由于Web服务安全策略语言的复杂性,很难验证安全策略的一致性。我们正在开发一种方法,通过对安全策略进行抽象来验证它们的一致性。每个安全策略都被抽象出来,然后作为安全类型附加到应用程序模型中的相应服务。安全类型表示消息保护的安全级别。安全开发人员定义可能的抽象方法。本文基于策略语言的语义定义了抽象方法的约束。并阐述了利用信息流分析验证安全类型一致性的方法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Verifying the Consistency of Security Policies by Abstracting into Security Types
The service-oriented architecture (SOA) makes application development easier, because applications can be built from existing services with a bottom-up methodology. However, it is difficult to determine if a desired new service can be built from existing services. Not only the functional consistency of the existing services, but also the consistency of their non-functional (such as security) aspects must be verified. Message protection is an aspect of security. Every service needs an appropriate security policy defining the protection of messages exchanged between the parties to the service. Because of the intricacy of the Web services security policy language, it is difficult to verify the consistency of the security policies. We are developing a method to verify the consistency of security policies by abstracting them. Each security policy is abstracted, and then attached as a security type to the corresponding service in the application model. The security type denotes a security level for message protection. The security developer defines the possible abstraction methods. In this paper, we define the constraint of abstraction methods based on the semantics of the policy language. And also we state verifying the consistency of security types by using information flow analysis.
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