2011年欧洲卖空禁令:治愈还是诅咒?

L. Félix, R. Kräussl, Philip A. Stork
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引用次数: 11

摘要

2011年8月欧洲对金融股的卖空禁令达到目的了吗?为了回答这个问题,我们使用股票期权的隐含波动率偏差来代表投资者的风险厌恶。我们发现,在禁令宣布当天,所有股票的风险厌恶程度都有所上升,但被禁金融股的风险厌恶程度更高。在禁令期间,被禁股票的波动性偏度仍然较高,但其他非禁令股票的波动性偏度有所下降。我们表明,是禁令本身的实施导致了风险厌恶情绪的增加,而不是其他原因,如信息流、期权交易量或股票特定因素。替代效应很小,因为在禁令期间,被禁股票的看跌期权交易量和看跌期权比率都有所下降。我们认为,尽管该禁令通过将交易活动转向指数期权,成功地遏制了金融股的进一步抛售压力,但这一结果是以风险厌恶情绪加剧和某种程度的市场失灵为代价的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The 2011 European Short Sale Ban: A Cure or a Curse?
Did the August 2011 European short sale bans on financial stocks accomplish their goals? In order to answer this question, we use stock options' implied volatility skews to proxy for investors' risk aversion. We find that on ban announcement day, risk aversion levels rose for all stocks but more so for the banned financial stocks. The banned stocks' volatility skews remained elevated during the ban but dropped for the other unbanned stocks. We show that it is the imposition of the ban itself that led to the increase in risk aversion rather than other causes such as information flow, options trading volumes, or stock specific factors. Substitution effects were minimal, as banned stocks' put trading volumes and put-call ratios declined during the ban. We argue that although the ban succeeded in curbing further selling pressure on financial stocks by redirecting trading activity towards index options, this result came at the cost of increased risk aversion and some degree of market failure.
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