具有边界的广泛形式的游戏抽象

Christian Kroer, T. Sandholm
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引用次数: 53

摘要

抽象已经成为解决不完全信息的广泛形式博弈的关键组成部分。然而,无损抽象通常太大而无法解决,因此需要有损抽象。所有先前用于广泛形式博弈的有损抽象算法,要么1)对解质量没有限制,要么2)依赖于特定的平衡计算方法,抽象形式有限,只减少了博弈树中信息集的数量,而不是节点的数量。我们引入了一个理论框架,该框架可用于给出任何完美召回广泛形式博弈的解质量边界。该框架使用了将抽象策略映射到原始博弈的新概念,并利用了新的均衡精化来进行分析。利用这个框架,我们开发了第一个通用的有界的有损扩展形式博弈抽象方法。实验表明,该方法在有无损抽象的情况下可以找到,而在需要更小抽象的情况下可以找到有损抽象。虽然我们的框架可以用于有损抽象,但如果我们将边界设置为零,它也是无损抽象的强大工具。先前的抽象算法通常在游戏树中逐级操作。我们引入了广泛形式的博弈树同构和动作子集选择问题,这两个问题都是逐级计算抽象的重要问题。证明了前者是图同构完备的,后者是np完备的。我们还证明了逐层抽象可能过于短视,从而无法找到甚至明显的无损抽象。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Extensive-form game abstraction with bounds
Abstraction has emerged as a key component in solving extensive-form games of incomplete information. However, lossless abstractions are typically too large to solve, so lossy abstraction is needed. All prior lossy abstraction algorithms for extensive-form games either 1) had no bounds on solution quality or 2) depended on specific equilibrium computation approaches, limited forms of abstraction, and only decreased the number of information sets rather than nodes in the game tree. We introduce a theoretical framework that can be used to give bounds on solution quality for any perfect-recall extensive-form game. The framework uses a new notion for mapping abstract strategies to the original game, and it leverages a new equilibrium refinement for analysis. Using this framework, we develop the first general lossy extensive-form game abstraction method with bounds. Experiments show that it finds a lossless abstraction when one is available and lossy abstractions when smaller abstractions are desired. While our framework can be used for lossy abstraction, it is also a powerful tool for lossless abstraction if we set the bound to zero. Prior abstraction algorithms typically operate level by level in the game tree. We introduce the extensive-form game tree isomorphism and action subset selection problems, both important problems for computing abstractions on a level-by-level basis. We show that the former is graph isomorphism complete, and the latter NP-complete. We also prove that level-by-level abstraction can be too myopic and thus fail to find even obvious lossless abstractions.
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