作为选民压制的职业社会化

D. Evans
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摘要

在一个大规模监禁的时代,许多人通过与监狱国家的互动来进行社交。这些互动是强大的学习经验,而它们是与民主公民背道而驰的。公民身份意味着属于一个平等的共同体,有权得到相互尊重和关心。刑事处罚故意伤害下属和侮辱。与监狱制度的接触是反民主社会化的强烈体验,它们影响了人们的公民意识和对政府的信任。因此,大量的社会科学研究表明,有亲密接触的合格选民投票或参政的可能性明显较低。因此,监狱制度对政治参与的影响远远超出了那些因定罪而被正式剥夺公民权的人。它还压制了数百万合法合格选民的参与,这些选民没有被正式剥夺选举权,他们与执法部门有过更短暂的接触,或者与监狱系统有过间接的互动。本文从投票权法及其背后的宪法价值的角度来考虑这些发现的含义。在投票权受到围攻的时刻,投票权的倡导者正在热烈讨论我们的联邦和州宪法如何保护民主公民身份和政治平等的理想。讨论主要集中在法律应该如何解决我所说的“法律上的”压制问题上(这是有充分理由的):有形的选举法和政策对投票设置法律障碍,或削弱投票权。消除这些投票的正式障碍至关重要。但是,我认为,要充分实现投票权背后的宪法价值,还需要解决我所说的“事实上的”压制,或通过社会化进行的压制。这不是通过对投票的正式法律限制来实现的,而是通过像监狱系统这样的国家机构,以一种与民主公民权不相容的方式,系统地将公民社会化。我展示了事实上的压制是如何像法律上的压制一样威胁到受投票权保护的宪法利益的。简而言之,通过以一种与民主公民身份根本不相容的方式系统地将人们社会化,国家可以有效地剥夺公民投票权所赋予的许多工具和内在价值。那些关心推进和保护投票权的人应该明白,监狱制度的反民主社会化是一种政治压制——它应该受到宪法审查,就像法律上的压制应该受到审查一样。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Carceral Socialization as Voter Suppression
In an era of mass incarceration, many people are socialized through interactions with the carceral state. These interactions are powerful learning experiences, and by design, they are contrary to democratic citizenship. Citizenship is about belonging to a community of equals, being entitled to mutual respect and concern. Criminal punishment deliberately harms, subordinates, and stigmatizes. Encounters with the carceral system are powerful experiences of anti-democratic socialization, and they impact peoples’ sense of citizenship and trust in government. Accordingly, a large body of social science research shows that eligible voters who have carceral contact are significantly less likely to vote or to participate in politics. Hence, the carceral system’s impact on political participation goes well beyond those who are formally disenfranchised due to convictions. It also suppresses participation among the millions of legally eligible voters who have not been formally disenfranchised—people who have had more fleeting encounters with law enforcement or vicarious interactions with the carceral system. This Article considers the implications of these findings from the perspective of voting rights law and the constitutional values underlying it. In a moment when voting rights are under siege, voting rights advocates are in a heated discussion about how our federal and state constitutions protect ideals of democratic citizenship and political equality. This discussion has largely (and for good reason) focused on how the law should address what I call “de jure” suppression: tangible election laws and policies that impose legal barriers to voting, or dilute voting power. Eliminating these formal barriers to voting is vital. But, I argue, fully realizing the constitutional values underlying voting rights will also require also addressing what I call “de facto” suppression, or suppression through socialization. This occurs not through formal legal restrictions on voting, but when state institutions like the carceral system systematically socialize citizens in a manner that is incompatible with democratic citizenship. I show how de facto suppression threatens the constitutional interests protected by the right to vote just like de jure suppression does. In short, by systematically socializing people in a manner that is fundamentally incompatible with democratic citizenship, the state can effectively strip a citizen of much of the instrumental and intrinsic value conferred by the right to vote. Those who are concerned about advancing and protecting voting rights should understand the carceral system’s anti-democratic socialization as a form of political suppression—one that should warrant constitutional scrutiny for the same reasons that de jure suppression should warrant scrutiny.
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