论算法交易费:挑战与机制设计

M. Abbasi, M. Manshaei, M. Rahman, K. Akkaya, Murtuza Jadliwala
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引用次数: 1

摘要

Algorand是一个公共权益证明(PoS)区块链,吞吐量为每小时750 MB的交易,是比特币的125倍。虽然Algorand的吞吐量取决于其大多数节点的参与,但理性节点可能表现得很自私,不与其他节点合作。为了鼓励节点参与共识协议,Algorand在每轮中奖励节点。然而,目前Algorand不向参与节点支付交易费用,而是将其存储起来以备将来使用。在本文中,我们证明了Algorand的这种当前方法激励自私的区块提议者通过创建空区块来增加他们的利润。这种自私的行为降低了Algorand的吞吐量。因此,从长远来看,Algo的价格将会下降。由于价格下降,节点将离开Algorand,从而危及其安全性。此外,缺乏适当的机制向参与者支付费用会导致其他问题,例如缺乏透明度、集中化以及节点无法优先处理事务。为了克服这一挑战,我们设计了一个完全竞争的市场,并提出了一种算法来计算Algorand中最优的交易费用和块大小。我们还提出了一种算法,在不影响其安全性的情况下降低Algorand的成本。我们进一步模拟了Algorand网络,并展示了如何在实践中计算最佳交易费用和块大小。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
On Algorand Transaction Fees: Challenges and Mechanism Design
Algorand is a public proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain with a throughput of 750 MB of transactions per hour, 125 times more than Bitcoin. While the throughput of Algorand depends on the participation of most of its nodes, rational nodes may behave selfishly and not cooperate with others. To encourage nodes to participate in the consensus protocol, Algorand rewards nodes in each round. However, currently Algorand does not pay transaction fees to participating nodes, rather storing it for future use. In this paper, we show that this current approach of Algorand motivates selfish block proposers to increase their profits by creating empty blocks. Such selfish behavior reduces the throughput of Algorand. Therefore, the price of Algo will decrease in the long run. Because of this price reduction, nodes will leave Algorand, compromising its security. Moreover, lack of an appropriate mechanism to pay fees to participants causes additional issues, such as lack of transparency, centralization, and inability of nodes to prioritize transactions. To overcome this challenge, we design a perfectly competitive market and propose an algorithm for computing optimal transaction fees and block size in Algorand We also propose an algorithm that reduces the cost of Algorand, without compromising its security. We further simulate the Algorand network and show how the optimal transaction fee and block size can be calculated in practice.
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