关于“大问题”主义的主要问题

Kevin O. Leske
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引用次数: 4

摘要

经过十多年的蛰伏,美国最高法院终于唤醒了“重大问题”原则,并以扩大的形式重新出现。根据这一原则,在案件涉及具有深刻经济或政治意义的问题,或者解释问题可能导致机构监管权力的巨大和变革性扩张的情况下,法院不会服从机构对法定条款的解释。虽然该原则在最近最高法院案件中的重新出现已经引起了人们的关注,但其应用的微妙变化却未被注意到。与早期的案件不同,法院在雪佛龙框架的第一步中援引了主要问题原则,法院最近在雪佛龙分析的其他阶段应用了该原则。例如,在公用事业空气监管集团诉环保署案中,法院首先发现,在雪佛龙公司的第一步中,争议的法定条款是含糊不清的。然后,它提出了主要问题原则作为第二步分析的一部分,以发现该机构的解释是不合理的。与之形成鲜明对比的是,在金诉伯韦尔案中,最高法院援引了“雪佛龙步骤零”的主要问题原则,从而完全拒绝应用雪佛龙框架。重大问题理论的重新出现及其扩大应用具有重大意义,并引起了理论和实际问题。因此,本文试图向法律界重新介绍该原则,并解释最高法院最近对该原则的应用,以证明其新发现的范围如何以及为何值得进一步研究。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Major Questions about the 'Major Questions' Doctrine
After over a decade of hibernation, the United States Supreme Court has awoken the “major questions” doctrine, which has re-emerged in an expanded form. Under the doctrine, a court will not defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision in circumstances where the case involves an issue of deep economic or political significance or where the interpretive question could effectuate an enormous and transformative expansion of the agency’s regulatory authority. While the doctrine’s re-emergence in recent Supreme Court cases has already raised concerns, a subtle shift in its application has gone unnoticed. Unlike in earlier cases, where the Court invoked the major questions doctrine under Step One of the Chevron framework, the Court has recently applied the doctrine in other stages of the Chevron analysis. For instance, in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, the Court first found that the statutory provision at issue was ambiguous under Chevron Step One. It then raised the major questions doctrine as part of its Step Two analysis to find that the agency’s interpretation was unreasonable. In stark contrast, the Court in King v. Burwell invoked the major questions doctrine at Chevron Step Zero and thereby declined to apply the Chevron framework altogether. The re-emergence of the major questions doctrine and its expanded application is significant and raises doctrinal and pragmatic concerns. Accordingly, this Essay seeks to re-introduce the doctrine to the legal community and explain the Court’s recent application of the doctrine to demonstrate how and why its newfound scope warrants further study.
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