自我保险计划之争,或“一个好漏洞值得另一个”

R. Korobkin
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引用次数: 5

摘要

《雇员退休收入保障法》(ERISA)的优先条款最令人费解的后果之一是,对雇主“自我保险”计划直接向雇员提供的雇主赞助的医疗保健福利和向雇主出售保险单的第三方提供的福利,给予不同的监管待遇。根据ERISA的储蓄条款,各州可以对保险合同进行监管,从而允许监管机构向“投保”的雇员提供一系列国家规定的健康保险福利。但根据ERISA的免偿条款,自我保险计划不受此类要求的约束。自从30年前ERISA法案通过以来,选择自行投保健康福利计划的雇主数量激增,然后为该计划购买“止损”保险,以避免国家强制要求和保险风险。批评人士对这种规避监管策略的使用表示不满。本文为雇主利用“deemer条款漏洞”辩护,理由是它符合ERISA清晰的语言、结构和潜在目标的微妙平衡。但它认为,ERISA包含一个补充的“储蓄条款漏洞”,州监管机构可以通过监管止损保险公司来利用这一漏洞,从而利用自助补救措施实质上填补了deemer条款的漏洞。一个好的漏洞值得另一个。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Battle Over Self-Insured Health Plans, or 'One Good Loophole Deserves Another'
One of the most perplexing consequences of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act's (ERISA) preemption provisions is the differential regulatory treatment afforded to employer-sponsored health care benefits provided directly to employees by the employer's "self-insured" plan and to benefits provided by a third party that sells an insurance policy to the employer. Under ERISA's savings clause, states may regulate insurance contracts, thus allowing regulators to guarantee "insured" employees a menu of state-mandated health-insurance benefits. But under ERISA's deemer clause, self-insured plans are immune to such requirements. Since ERISA's passage three decades ago, there has been an explosion in the number of employers choosing to self-insure their health benefits plans and then purchase "stop-loss" insurance for the plan in order to avoid both state mandates and insurance risk. Critics cry foul at the use of this regulation-avoidance tactic. This Article defends employers' exploitation of the "deemer clause loophole" on the grounds that it is consistent with ERISA's clear language, structure, and delicate balance of underlying goals. But it argues that ERISA contains a complementary "savings clause loophole" that state regulators can exploit by regulating stop-loss insurance companies, thus using a self-help remedy to close the deemer clause loophole substantially. One good loophole deserves another.
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