经济与货币联盟、危机与政治问责制

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引用次数: 0

摘要

欧洲货币联盟是欧盟的核心政策领域之一。欧洲货币联盟于1993年根据《马斯特里赫特条约》(Maastricht Treaty)成立,它包含了欧洲一体化的有形象征——欧元——存在于欧洲数百万公民的生活中。对于采用欧元并组成欧元区的国家来说,欧洲货币联盟政策的经济、财政和社会影响是深远的。非欧元区经济体也会受到欧洲货币联盟决策的影响,尽管影响程度较为有限。然而,尽管在欧洲货币联盟中,决策权从国家层面向欧盟层面发生了重大转变,但它的设计者并没有建立相应的机制,让相关行为者对该领域的政策决策负责。2007-2008年的全球经济和金融危机引发了欧元区长期的主权债务危机(此后称为“欧元危机”),迫使人们对最初的欧洲货币联盟架构进行了反思。从那时起,欧洲货币联盟的制度设计和政策范围得到了扩大,而问责制框架得到了加强——特别是在欧洲议会审查不同执行主体决策的作用方面。为了介绍本书的政策细节,本章概述了欧洲货币联盟及其政治问责制结构。出发点是欧洲货币联盟在欧盟层面的历史发展,强调了其经济和货币政策部门之间的制度不对称。因此,由欧元危机(大约2009-2014年)引发的改革,是在欧洲货币联盟设计存在系统性缺陷的背景下进行的。接下来,本章将讨论欧洲货币联盟的问责框架,特别是其政治问责机制的特点。本章以各国议会和欧洲议会为重点,强调了让执行者对欧洲货币联盟的决策负责的困难。自欧元危机以来,欧洲议会获得了对欧洲货币联盟政府间和超国家机构的新的审查权力。这个问题
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Economic and Monetary Union, the Crisis, and Political Accountability
The EMU is one of the central policy fields of the European Union. Established in 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty, the EMU comprises a tangible symbol of European integration – the euro – present in the lives of millions of citizens across Europe. For countries that adopted the euro and formed the Eurozone, the economic, fiscal, and social impact of EMU policies is profound. Non-Eurozone economies are also affected by EMU decisions, albeit to a more limited extent. Yet despite the significant shift in decision-making powers from the national to the EU level entailed in the EMU, its architects did not establish corresponding mechanisms to hold relevant actors accountable for policy decisions in the field. The global economic and financial crisis of 2007–2008 triggered a prolonged sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone (henceforth the ‘euro crisis’) that forced a reckoning of the original EMU architecture. Since then, the institutional design and policy scope of EMU have expanded, while the accountability framework has been strengthened – especially when it comes to the role of the EP in scrutinising the decisions of different executive actors. To introduce the policy specifics of the book, this chapter provides an overview of the EMU and its political accountability structure. The starting point is the historical development of the EMU at the EU level, emphasising the institutional asymmetry between its economic and monetary policy arms. The reforms triggered by the euro crisis (roughly 2009–2014) are hence contextualised against the background of the systemic deficiencies of EMU design. Next, the chapter moves to discussing the accountability framework of EMU and, in particular, the characteristics of its political accountability mechanisms. Focusing on national parliaments and the EP, the chapter underlines the difficulties of holding executive actors accountable for EMU decisions. Since the euro crisis, the EP gained new scrutiny powers over both intergovernmental and supranational institutions in the EMU. The question
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