P2P网络中的抑制机制研究

2010 3rd International Conference on Advanced Computer Theory and Engineering(ICACTE) Pub Date : 2010-09-20 DOI:10.1109/ICACTE.2010.5579519

Dongwei Guo, Kangping Wang, Miao Liu, Tingting Shi, Jialun Du

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引用次数: 0

摘要

如果每个用户都像搭便车者一样，只从系统中获取资源，而从不做出贡献，那么点对点(P2P)系统将会缺乏资源。在制定方案时，除了激励用户贡献资源外，抑制搭便车也很重要。本文采用博弈论探讨P2P网络中节点的行为，提出了一种以牙还牙的机制。一个节点的信誉评分是分散的，并由其对应节点根据其过去对其请求的反应在本地存储。实验结果证明，由于搭便车者比利他节点需要更多的时间来下载资源，因此可以有效地抑制搭便车者。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Researches on inhibition mechanism in P2P networks

A peer-to-peer (P2P) system will starve from resource if every user acts as a free rider who only takes resources from the system but never contributes. While developing a scheme, it is also important to inhibit free riders besides incentivizing users to contribute resources. In this paper, we adopt game theory to explore behaviors of nodes in P2P networks and present a Tit-for-Tat based mechanism. The reputation of one node is scored dispersedly and stored locally by its counterparts, according to its past reactions to their requests. Experimental results have prove that free riders are inhibited effectively since it takes more time for them to download resources than altruistic nodes.

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来源期刊

2010 3rd International Conference on Advanced Computer Theory and Engineering(ICACTE)

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