不平等和间接欺诈?信息和通信技术干预:对印度尼西亚中苏拉威西省暴力的差异、社会凝聚力和次国家差异的看法的证据

R. Diprose
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文考察了印度尼西亚中苏拉威西两个相邻地区的社会凝聚力和感知水平不平等的经验证据。尽管有类似规模的团体(宗教两极化,种族分裂),并且在1998年开始的全国政治过渡期间有机会动员起来,但只有一个地区发生了严重的暴力事件。首先,证据表明,这种暴力与在进入国家方面的横向不平等有关,特别是在受冲突影响的地区,在宗教认同方面。在同一地区,也有证据表明社会凝聚力较弱:对其他宗教群体的负面刻板印象更为普遍,在日常交往和友谊方面,宗教间的混合最少。这些态度和较少的混合也更有可能出现在权力分享安排破裂后最初被国家边缘化的群体中。与此同时,在暴力事件较少的地区,总体而言,宗教团体之间的混合更为频繁,尤其是那些没有统治国家的团体。也就是说,频繁的宗教间群体混合和这个群体对其他群体没有消极态度可能表明,它不是一个可以为政治利益而动员起来的可行群体。相反,在这个更和平的地区,种族认同是政治资本的更突出形式,但从人口统计学上看,这个地区的种族是分散的。在这个地区,种族间的混合比宗教间的混合更少,但在按宗教和种族划分的主要政治群体中,这种情况最为严重。然而,主导政治群体成员之间的消极态度和更强的群体内(而非群体外)联系并没有转化为暴力犯罪。因为在过渡期间,他们的权力受到的挑战很少。最后,证据表明,混合种族或宗教组织的协会成员不太可能解释暴力预防,因为这类组织的成员人数在美国更多。ict-affected区。总的来说,证据表明,人口差异并不总是政治分歧和欺诈倾向的指标。但这与排斥政治有关。此外,这表明在一定程度上增加的跨群体接触可以起到间接的作用。信息通信技术干预机制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Inequalities and Indirect Con?ict Interventions: The Evidence on Perceptions of Difference, Social Cohesion, and Sub-national Variations in Violence in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia
This paper examines the empirical evidence on social cohesion and perceived horizontal inequalities in two neighbouring districts in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. Despite having similar sized groups (religiously polarised, ethnically fragmented) and the opportunity to mobilise during the national political transition beginning in 1998, only one of the districts had serious violence. First, the evidence suggests that such violence was linked to perceived horizontal inequalities in terms of access to the state, particularly in terms of religious identity in the district affected by con?ict. In the same district, there was also evidence of weaker social cohesion: there were more pervasive negative stereotypes of other groups along religious lines, and the least inter-religious mixing in terms of everyday interaction and friendships. These attitudes and less frequent mixing were more likely, too, among the group that was initially marginalised from the state when power-sharing arrangements broke down. Meanwhile, in the district with less violence, there was more frequent inter-religious group mixing overall but particularly on the part of the group that did not dominate the state. That is, frequent inter-religious group mixing and the absence of negative attitudes on the part of this group towards others may have signalled that it was not a viable group to be mobilised for political gain. Instead, in this more peaceful district, ethnic identity was the more salient form of political capital, but demographically the district is ethnically fragmented. Inter-ethnic rather than religious mixing was less frequent in this district, but it was worst among the dominant political group along religious and ethnic lines. Yet, the negative attitudes and stronger in-group (rather than out-group) bonds between members of the dominant political group did not translate into violent con?ict because there were minimal challenges to their power during the transition. Finally, the evidence suggests that the associational membership of mixedethnic or religious organisations is less likely to explain violence prevention, given that membership of such organisations was greater in the con?ict-affected district. The evidence overall suggests that demographic divides are not always an indicator of political divides and the propensity for con?ict, but rather this is related to the politics of exclusion. Furthermore, it indicates that to some extent increased crossgroup contact can act as an indirect con?ict intervention mechanism.
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