破坏和修复虚拟通道:多米诺骨牌攻击和唐纳

Lukas Aumayr, Pedro A. Moreno-Sánchez, Aniket Kate, Matteo Maffei
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引用次数: 4

摘要

-支付通道网络(pcn)缓解了当前去中心化加密货币的可扩展性问题。它们允许通过中间支付渠道的路径连接的用户之间进行任意多的支付,同时只需要与区块链进行交互来打开和关闭通道。不幸的是,pcn是(i)为支付量身定制的,不包括更复杂的智能合约功能,例如启用oracle的离散日志合约(Discreet Log Contracts); (ii)它们对中介机构积极参与的需求可能会使支付不可靠、更慢、更昂贵,并且侵犯隐私。虚拟通道是缓解这些问题最有前途的技术之一,它允许路径的两个端点在中介上创建直接通道,而无需与区块链进行任何交互。在构建了这样一个虚拟通道之后,(i)端点可以将这个直接通道用于支付以外的应用程序,(ii)中间商不再参与更新。在这项工作中,我们首先介绍了Domino攻击,这是一种新的DoS/悲伤风格的攻击,它利用虚拟通道破坏PCN本身,并且是现有比特币兼容虚拟通道所采用的设计所固有的。然后,我们通过对闪电网络(LN)快照的定量分析来证明其严重性,闪电网络是目前部署最广泛的PCN。我们最后讨论了现有虚拟通道设计的其他严重缺点,例如仅支持单个中介,延迟和路径长度线性的区块链开销,或者每个用户的非恒定存储开销。然后,我们介绍了Donner,这是第一个通过依赖于一种新颖的设计范式来克服上述缺点的虚拟渠道构建。我们正式定义并证明了通用可组合性框架中的安全性和隐私性。我们的评估表明,Donner是高效的,它将链上的争议事务从路径长度的线性减少到单个,这是防止Domino攻击的关键,并且将存储开销从路径长度的对数减少到常数。Donner与比特币兼容,可以很容易地集成到LN中
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Breaking and Fixing Virtual Channels: Domino Attack and Donner
—Payment channel networks (PCNs) mitigate the scalability issues of current decentralized cryptocurrencies. They allow for arbitrarily many payments between users connected through a path of intermediate payment channels, while requiring interacting with the blockchain only to open and close the chan- nels. Unfortunately, PCNs are (i) tailored to payments, excluding more complex smart contract functionalities, such as the oracle- enabling Discreet Log Contracts and (ii) their need for active participation from intermediaries may make payments unreliable, slower, expensive, and privacy-invasive. Virtual channels are among the most promising techniques to mitigate these issues, allowing two endpoints of a path to create a direct channel over the intermediaries without any interaction with the blockchain. After such a virtual channel is constructed, (i) the endpoints can use this direct channel for applications other than payments and (ii) the intermediaries are no longer involved in updates. In this work, we first introduce the Domino attack, a new DoS/griefing style attack that leverages virtual channels to destruct the PCN itself and is inherent to the design adopted by the existing Bitcoin-compatible virtual channels. We then demonstrate its severity by a quantitative analysis on a snapshot of the Lightning Network (LN), the most widely deployed PCN at present. We finally discuss other serious drawbacks of existing virtual channel designs, such as the support for only a single intermediary, a latency and blockchain overhead linear in the path length, or a non-constant storage overhead per user. We then present Donner, the first virtual channel construction that overcomes the shortcomings above, by relying on a novel design paradigm. We formally define and prove security and privacy properties in the Universal Composability framework. Our evaluation shows that Donner is efficient, reduces the on- chain number of transactions for disputes from linear in the path length to a single one, which is the key to prevent Domino attacks, and reduces the storage overhead from logarithmic in the path length to constant. Donner is Bitcoin-compatible and can be easily integrated in the LN
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