破解蒙面和洗牌的CCA安全军刀密钥

Kalle Ngo, E. Dubrova, T. Johansson
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引用次数: 21

摘要

在本文中,我们证明了一阶掩蔽和洗牌保护的CCA安全Saber KEM的软件实现可以通过基于深度学习的功率分析来破坏。使用在分析阶段创建的深度神经网络集合,我们可以分别从257xN和24x257xN跟踪中恢复会话密钥和长期秘密密钥,其中N是相同测量的重复次数。N的取值取决于实现、环境因素、采集噪声等;在我们的实验中,N=10足以成功。神经网络在80%来自已知洗牌顺序的分析设备的痕迹和20%来自被攻击设备的痕迹的组合上进行训练,这些痕迹被捕获为全0和全1消息。用受到攻击的设备的痕迹“调味”训练集有助于最大限度地减少设备可变性的负面影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Breaking Masked and Shuffled CCA Secure Saber KEM by Power Analysis
In this paper, we show that a software implementation of CCA secure Saber KEM protected by first-order masking and shuffling can be broken by deep learning-based power analysis. Using an ensemble of deep neural networks created at the profiling stage, we can recover the session key and the long-term secret key from 257xN and 24x257xN traces, respectively, where N is the number of repetitions of the same measurement. The value of N depends on the implementation, environmental factors, acquisition noise, etc.; in our experiments N=10 is enough to succeed. The neural networks are trained on a combination of 80% of traces from the profiling device with a known shuffling order and 20% of traces from the device under attack captured for all-0 and all-1 messages. "Spicing" the training set with traces from the device under attack helps minimize the negative effect of device variability.
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