{"title":"破解蒙面和洗牌的CCA安全军刀密钥","authors":"Kalle Ngo, E. Dubrova, T. Johansson","doi":"10.1145/3474376.3487277","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we show that a software implementation of CCA secure Saber KEM protected by first-order masking and shuffling can be broken by deep learning-based power analysis. Using an ensemble of deep neural networks created at the profiling stage, we can recover the session key and the long-term secret key from 257xN and 24x257xN traces, respectively, where N is the number of repetitions of the same measurement. The value of N depends on the implementation, environmental factors, acquisition noise, etc.; in our experiments N=10 is enough to succeed. The neural networks are trained on a combination of 80% of traces from the profiling device with a known shuffling order and 20% of traces from the device under attack captured for all-0 and all-1 messages. \"Spicing\" the training set with traces from the device under attack helps minimize the negative effect of device variability.","PeriodicalId":339465,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"21","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Breaking Masked and Shuffled CCA Secure Saber KEM by Power Analysis\",\"authors\":\"Kalle Ngo, E. Dubrova, T. Johansson\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3474376.3487277\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper, we show that a software implementation of CCA secure Saber KEM protected by first-order masking and shuffling can be broken by deep learning-based power analysis. Using an ensemble of deep neural networks created at the profiling stage, we can recover the session key and the long-term secret key from 257xN and 24x257xN traces, respectively, where N is the number of repetitions of the same measurement. The value of N depends on the implementation, environmental factors, acquisition noise, etc.; in our experiments N=10 is enough to succeed. The neural networks are trained on a combination of 80% of traces from the profiling device with a known shuffling order and 20% of traces from the device under attack captured for all-0 and all-1 messages. \\\"Spicing\\\" the training set with traces from the device under attack helps minimize the negative effect of device variability.\",\"PeriodicalId\":339465,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security\",\"volume\":\"40 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-11-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"21\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3474376.3487277\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3474376.3487277","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Breaking Masked and Shuffled CCA Secure Saber KEM by Power Analysis
In this paper, we show that a software implementation of CCA secure Saber KEM protected by first-order masking and shuffling can be broken by deep learning-based power analysis. Using an ensemble of deep neural networks created at the profiling stage, we can recover the session key and the long-term secret key from 257xN and 24x257xN traces, respectively, where N is the number of repetitions of the same measurement. The value of N depends on the implementation, environmental factors, acquisition noise, etc.; in our experiments N=10 is enough to succeed. The neural networks are trained on a combination of 80% of traces from the profiling device with a known shuffling order and 20% of traces from the device under attack captured for all-0 and all-1 messages. "Spicing" the training set with traces from the device under attack helps minimize the negative effect of device variability.