{"title":"基于SDR测试平台的V2V安全性评估","authors":"Geoff Twardokus, Hanif Rahbari","doi":"10.1109/INFOCOMWKSHPS51825.2021.9484435","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We showcase the capabilities of V2Verifier, a new open-source software-defined radio (SDR) testbed for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications security, to expose the strengths and vulnerabilities of current V2V security systems based on the IEEE 1609.2 standard. V2Verifier supports both major V2V technologies and facilitates a broad range of experimentation with upper- and lower-layer attacks using a combination of SDRs and commercial V2V on-board units (OBUs). We demonstrate two separate attacks (jamming and replay) against Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) and Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) technologies, experimentally quantifying the threat posed by these types of attacks. We also use V2Verifier’s open-source implementation to show how the 1609.2 standard can effectively mitigate certain types of attacks (e.g., message replay), facilitating further research into the security of V2V.","PeriodicalId":109588,"journal":{"name":"IEEE INFOCOM 2021 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Evaluating V2V Security on an SDR Testbed\",\"authors\":\"Geoff Twardokus, Hanif Rahbari\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/INFOCOMWKSHPS51825.2021.9484435\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We showcase the capabilities of V2Verifier, a new open-source software-defined radio (SDR) testbed for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications security, to expose the strengths and vulnerabilities of current V2V security systems based on the IEEE 1609.2 standard. V2Verifier supports both major V2V technologies and facilitates a broad range of experimentation with upper- and lower-layer attacks using a combination of SDRs and commercial V2V on-board units (OBUs). We demonstrate two separate attacks (jamming and replay) against Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) and Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) technologies, experimentally quantifying the threat posed by these types of attacks. We also use V2Verifier’s open-source implementation to show how the 1609.2 standard can effectively mitigate certain types of attacks (e.g., message replay), facilitating further research into the security of V2V.\",\"PeriodicalId\":109588,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE INFOCOM 2021 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS)\",\"volume\":\"18 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-05-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE INFOCOM 2021 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOMWKSHPS51825.2021.9484435\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE INFOCOM 2021 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOMWKSHPS51825.2021.9484435","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We showcase the capabilities of V2Verifier, a new open-source software-defined radio (SDR) testbed for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications security, to expose the strengths and vulnerabilities of current V2V security systems based on the IEEE 1609.2 standard. V2Verifier supports both major V2V technologies and facilitates a broad range of experimentation with upper- and lower-layer attacks using a combination of SDRs and commercial V2V on-board units (OBUs). We demonstrate two separate attacks (jamming and replay) against Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) and Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) technologies, experimentally quantifying the threat posed by these types of attacks. We also use V2Verifier’s open-source implementation to show how the 1609.2 standard can effectively mitigate certain types of attacks (e.g., message replay), facilitating further research into the security of V2V.