{"title":"电子商务环境下双边多目标谈判的交换出价议价机制","authors":"Yonghui Ling, Xiubin Xu, Zhaoming Wang","doi":"10.1109/CCCM.2008.151","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the multi-agent system (MAS), negotiation is a means for agents to communicate and compromise (concession) to reach a mutually beneficial agreement, and can be viewed as a bargaining process. By the games theory, there are three crucial features in such a process: the time constraint of the bargainers, the information state of the bargainers and the number of issues (goals) to be bargained over. Against this background, this paper develops an alternating-offers bargaining based mechanism for bilateral multi-goal and incomplete information negotiation in electronic commence environment. In particular, we are concerned with the change of negotiation strategies of the both sides. So we present some strategy rules which the agents should observe during the course of negotiation. Our analysis shows the existence of equilibrium through these strategy rules. Furthermore, we also have a discussion on the satisfiability condition of a deal. Experimental results of simulation during the negotiation process indicate that the strategy rules are efficient for the negotiation.","PeriodicalId":326534,"journal":{"name":"2008 ISECS International Colloquium on Computing, Communication, Control, and Management","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An Alternating-Offers Bargaining Based Mechanism for Bilateral Multi-goal Negotiations in Electronic Commerce Setting\",\"authors\":\"Yonghui Ling, Xiubin Xu, Zhaoming Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CCCM.2008.151\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In the multi-agent system (MAS), negotiation is a means for agents to communicate and compromise (concession) to reach a mutually beneficial agreement, and can be viewed as a bargaining process. By the games theory, there are three crucial features in such a process: the time constraint of the bargainers, the information state of the bargainers and the number of issues (goals) to be bargained over. Against this background, this paper develops an alternating-offers bargaining based mechanism for bilateral multi-goal and incomplete information negotiation in electronic commence environment. In particular, we are concerned with the change of negotiation strategies of the both sides. So we present some strategy rules which the agents should observe during the course of negotiation. Our analysis shows the existence of equilibrium through these strategy rules. Furthermore, we also have a discussion on the satisfiability condition of a deal. Experimental results of simulation during the negotiation process indicate that the strategy rules are efficient for the negotiation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":326534,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2008 ISECS International Colloquium on Computing, Communication, Control, and Management\",\"volume\":\"134 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-08-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2008 ISECS International Colloquium on Computing, Communication, Control, and Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CCCM.2008.151\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2008 ISECS International Colloquium on Computing, Communication, Control, and Management","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CCCM.2008.151","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
An Alternating-Offers Bargaining Based Mechanism for Bilateral Multi-goal Negotiations in Electronic Commerce Setting
In the multi-agent system (MAS), negotiation is a means for agents to communicate and compromise (concession) to reach a mutually beneficial agreement, and can be viewed as a bargaining process. By the games theory, there are three crucial features in such a process: the time constraint of the bargainers, the information state of the bargainers and the number of issues (goals) to be bargained over. Against this background, this paper develops an alternating-offers bargaining based mechanism for bilateral multi-goal and incomplete information negotiation in electronic commence environment. In particular, we are concerned with the change of negotiation strategies of the both sides. So we present some strategy rules which the agents should observe during the course of negotiation. Our analysis shows the existence of equilibrium through these strategy rules. Furthermore, we also have a discussion on the satisfiability condition of a deal. Experimental results of simulation during the negotiation process indicate that the strategy rules are efficient for the negotiation.