A Prospect Theoretic Extension of a Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Eavesdropping and Jamming Game

Wireless networks are susceptible to malicious attacks, especially those involving jamming and eavesdropping. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated adversary with the dual capability of either eavesdropping passively or jamming any ongoing transmission. We investigate a new aspect to consider when designing an anti-adversary strategy to maintain secure and reliable communication: how subjective behavior can impact multi-time slotted communication in the presence of such a sophisticated adversary. To model this scenario we develop a Prospect Theory (PT) extension of a non-zero-sum stochastic game, and derive its PT-equilibrium in closed form for any probability weighting functions. Uniqueness of the PT-equilibrium is proven. Our theoretical results, also supported by simulations, suggest that the anti-adversary strategy is more sensitive to varying network parameters and subjective factors when compared to the adversary’s strategy.