云计算中的快速动态蜜罐提取

Sebastian Biedermann, M. Mink, S. Katzenbeisser
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引用次数: 19

摘要

在本文中,我们描述了动态蜜罐架构的设计、实现和评估,该架构可以作为提供基础设施即服务(IaaS)的云中的云用户提供额外的安全服务。蜜罐可以保护原有系统,同时暴露新的和未知的攻击。提出的动态蜜罐架构在初始阶段检测到潜在的攻击,并延迟攻击,直到从受攻击的原始虚拟机中提取出新的蜜罐虚拟机。提取过程是一个修改虚拟机的实时克隆过程,可以保留合理的数据,防止内部数据丢失。这样,新创建的蜜罐虚拟机在完全相同的最新配置中运行相同的软件。蜜罐控制器在不影响原始目标虚拟机完整性的前提下,将延迟攻击重定向到提取的蜜罐虚拟机,并分析其影响。所建议的体系结构受益于云的灵活性和适应性。它可以有效地保护云用户的虚拟机免受当代网络攻击,同时只需要少量额外的云资源。该架构可以欺骗和误导攻击者或攻击源,但不影响云中原有虚拟机的正常工作流程。基于定义的报告格式,云用户可以从针对其虚拟机的攻击中学习,并发现当前的错误配置和未知漏洞。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Fast dynamic extracted honeypots in cloud computing
In this paper, we describe the design, the implementation and the evaluation of a dynamic honeypot architecture which can be offered as an additional security service for cloud users in a cloud that offers Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). Honeypots can protect original systems while revealing new and unknown attacks at the same time. The proposed dynamic honeypot architecture detects potential attacks in the initial phases and delays these attacks until a new honeypot virtual machine (VM) is extracted from the original VM which is under attack. The extraction process is a modifying VM live cloning process which leaves sensible data behind and prevents internal data loss. This way, the newly created honeypot VM runs the same software in exactly the same up-to-date configuration. The honeypot controller redirects the delayed attack to the extracted honeypot VM and analyses its impact without risking the integrity of the original target VM. The proposed architecture benefits from the flexibility and adaptability of the cloud. It efficiently protects VMs of cloud users from contemporary network attacks while only few additional cloud resources are temporarily needed. The architecture deceives and misleads an attacker or an attacking source but does not influence the normal work-flow of the original VMs in the cloud. Based on a defined reporting format, cloud users can learn from attacks which have targeted their VMs and discover current misconfigurations and unknown vulnerabilities.
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