基于前缀哈希的通用Fujisaki-Okamoto变换的更快格基kem

Julien Duman, Eike Kiltz, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Gregor Seiler
{"title":"基于前缀哈希的通用Fujisaki-Okamoto变换的更快格基kem","authors":"Julien Duman, Eike Kiltz, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Gregor Seiler","doi":"10.1145/3460120.3484819","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Constructing an efficient CCA-secure KEM is generally done by first constructing a passively-secure PKE scheme, and then applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transformation. The original FO transformation was designed to offer security in a single user setting. A stronger notion, known as multi-user security, considers the attacker's advantage in breaking one of many user's ciphertexts. Bellare et al. (EUROCRYPT 2000) showed that standard single user security implies multi-user security with a multiplicative tightness gap equivalent to the number of users. To obtain even more confidence in the security of KEMs in the multi-user setting, it is a common design paradigm to also \"domain separate'' the random oracles of each user by including his public key as an input to the hash function. We are not aware of any formal analysis of this technique, but it was at least informally thought to be a computationally cheap way to add security. This design principle was carried over into the FO transformations used by several schemes in the NIST post-quantum standardization effort -- notably the lattice-based schemes Kyber and Saber, which are two of the four KEM finalists. In this work, we formally analyze domain separation in the context of the FO transformation in the multi-user setting. We first show that including the public key in the hash function is indeed important for the tightness of the security reductions in the ROM and the QROM. At the same time, we show that including the entire public key into the hash function is unnecessarily wasteful -- it is enough to include just a small (e.g. $32$ byte) unpredictable part of the key to achieve the same security. Reducing the input of the hash function results in a very noticeable improvement in the running time of the lattice-based KEMs. In particular, using this generic transform results in a 2X - 3X speed-up over the current (Round 3) key generation and encapsulation procedures in Kyber, and up to a 40% improvement in the same functions in Saber.","PeriodicalId":135883,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"10","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Faster Lattice-Based KEMs via a Generic Fujisaki-Okamoto Transform Using Prefix Hashing\",\"authors\":\"Julien Duman, Eike Kiltz, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Gregor Seiler\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3460120.3484819\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Constructing an efficient CCA-secure KEM is generally done by first constructing a passively-secure PKE scheme, and then applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transformation. The original FO transformation was designed to offer security in a single user setting. A stronger notion, known as multi-user security, considers the attacker's advantage in breaking one of many user's ciphertexts. Bellare et al. (EUROCRYPT 2000) showed that standard single user security implies multi-user security with a multiplicative tightness gap equivalent to the number of users. To obtain even more confidence in the security of KEMs in the multi-user setting, it is a common design paradigm to also \\\"domain separate'' the random oracles of each user by including his public key as an input to the hash function. We are not aware of any formal analysis of this technique, but it was at least informally thought to be a computationally cheap way to add security. This design principle was carried over into the FO transformations used by several schemes in the NIST post-quantum standardization effort -- notably the lattice-based schemes Kyber and Saber, which are two of the four KEM finalists. In this work, we formally analyze domain separation in the context of the FO transformation in the multi-user setting. We first show that including the public key in the hash function is indeed important for the tightness of the security reductions in the ROM and the QROM. At the same time, we show that including the entire public key into the hash function is unnecessarily wasteful -- it is enough to include just a small (e.g. $32$ byte) unpredictable part of the key to achieve the same security. Reducing the input of the hash function results in a very noticeable improvement in the running time of the lattice-based KEMs. In particular, using this generic transform results in a 2X - 3X speed-up over the current (Round 3) key generation and encapsulation procedures in Kyber, and up to a 40% improvement in the same functions in Saber.\",\"PeriodicalId\":135883,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security\",\"volume\":\"33 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-11-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"10\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484819\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484819","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10

摘要

构造一个有效的cca安全KEM通常是先构造一个被动安全的PKE方案,然后应用Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO)变换。最初的FO转换被设计为在单个用户设置中提供安全性。一个更强大的概念,称为多用户安全性,考虑了攻击者在破解众多用户的密文中的一个方面的优势。Bellare等人(EUROCRYPT 2000)表明,标准的单用户安全性意味着多用户安全性,其乘积紧密度缺口相当于用户数量。为了在多用户设置中对kem的安全性获得更大的信心,一种常见的设计范例是通过将每个用户的公钥作为哈希函数的输入,对每个用户的随机oracle进行“域分离”。我们不知道对这种技术的任何正式分析,但至少非正式地认为它是一种增加安全性的计算成本较低的方法。这一设计原则被延续到NIST后量子标准化工作中几个方案所使用的FO变换中——特别是基于晶格的方案Kyber和Saber,它们是四个KEM决赛入选者中的两个。在这项工作中,我们正式分析了多用户设置下FO转换背景下的域分离。我们首先表明,在哈希函数中包含公钥对于ROM和QROM的安全性降低的紧密性确实很重要。同时,我们表明,将整个公钥包含到哈希函数中是不必要的浪费——仅包含密钥的一小部分(例如$32$字节)不可预测的部分就足以实现相同的安全性。减少哈希函数的输入可以显著改善基于格的kem的运行时间。特别地,使用这种通用变换可以使Kyber中的当前(第3轮)密钥生成和封装过程的速度提高2 - 3倍,并且在Saber中相同的功能中提高高达40%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Faster Lattice-Based KEMs via a Generic Fujisaki-Okamoto Transform Using Prefix Hashing
Constructing an efficient CCA-secure KEM is generally done by first constructing a passively-secure PKE scheme, and then applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transformation. The original FO transformation was designed to offer security in a single user setting. A stronger notion, known as multi-user security, considers the attacker's advantage in breaking one of many user's ciphertexts. Bellare et al. (EUROCRYPT 2000) showed that standard single user security implies multi-user security with a multiplicative tightness gap equivalent to the number of users. To obtain even more confidence in the security of KEMs in the multi-user setting, it is a common design paradigm to also "domain separate'' the random oracles of each user by including his public key as an input to the hash function. We are not aware of any formal analysis of this technique, but it was at least informally thought to be a computationally cheap way to add security. This design principle was carried over into the FO transformations used by several schemes in the NIST post-quantum standardization effort -- notably the lattice-based schemes Kyber and Saber, which are two of the four KEM finalists. In this work, we formally analyze domain separation in the context of the FO transformation in the multi-user setting. We first show that including the public key in the hash function is indeed important for the tightness of the security reductions in the ROM and the QROM. At the same time, we show that including the entire public key into the hash function is unnecessarily wasteful -- it is enough to include just a small (e.g. $32$ byte) unpredictable part of the key to achieve the same security. Reducing the input of the hash function results in a very noticeable improvement in the running time of the lattice-based KEMs. In particular, using this generic transform results in a 2X - 3X speed-up over the current (Round 3) key generation and encapsulation procedures in Kyber, and up to a 40% improvement in the same functions in Saber.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信