想法反馈

Zeinab Aboutalebi, Ayush Pant
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引用次数: 0

摘要

员工通常被分配的任务包括两个不同的阶段:第一阶段,产生想法;在第二阶段,最好的想法被执行。此外,在这个过程中,主管给员工反馈是很常见的。本文研究了监事问题。主管们面临着以下权衡:虽然诚实的反馈会鼓励员工放弃糟糕的想法,但它也可能会让员工失去动力。我们得到三个主要结果。首先,主管只给那些相信自己有能力成功的代理人诚实的反馈。其次,获得诚实的反馈会使这些高自我评价的代理人付出更多的努力。第三,过度自信可能会改善福利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Feedback on Ideas
Employees are often assigned tasks comprising two distinct phases: in the first phase, ideas are generated; in the second phase, the best idea is implemented. Furthermore, it is common for supervisors to give feedback to their employees during this process. This paper studies the supervisor’s problem. Supervisors face the following tradeoff: while honest feedback encourages employees to discard bad ideas, it can also be demotivating. We obtain three main results. First, the supervisor only gives honest feedback to agents who believe in their ability to succeed. Second, receiving honest feedback leads such high self-opinion agents to exert more effort. Third, overconfidence is potentially welfare improving.
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