{"title":"企业避税","authors":"D. Weisbach","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.487103","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This essay analyzes the problem of corporate tax avoidance. It shows how the marginal efficiency cost of funds and optimal elasticity of taxable income measures can be used to analyze the problem and determine the proper scope of allowable tax planning. It then analyzes the optimal form of tax laws addressing shelters, such as whether the law should use more detailed rules or broad standards.","PeriodicalId":161847,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"152 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"122","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Corporate Tax Avoidance\",\"authors\":\"D. Weisbach\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.487103\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This essay analyzes the problem of corporate tax avoidance. It shows how the marginal efficiency cost of funds and optimal elasticity of taxable income measures can be used to analyze the problem and determine the proper scope of allowable tax planning. It then analyzes the optimal form of tax laws addressing shelters, such as whether the law should use more detailed rules or broad standards.\",\"PeriodicalId\":161847,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"152 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2004-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"122\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.487103\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.487103","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay analyzes the problem of corporate tax avoidance. It shows how the marginal efficiency cost of funds and optimal elasticity of taxable income measures can be used to analyze the problem and determine the proper scope of allowable tax planning. It then analyzes the optimal form of tax laws addressing shelters, such as whether the law should use more detailed rules or broad standards.