软件供应链的风险探索者:理解基于开源的软件开发的攻击面

Piergiorgio Ladisa, H. Plate, Matias Martinez, Olivier Barais, Serena Elisa Ponta
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引用次数: 4

摘要

对开源项目的供应链攻击旨在注入和传播恶意代码,以便由直接和间接的下游用户执行。最近的工作将这类攻击的知识系统化,并以攻击树的形式提出了一种分类法。我们提出了一种名为软件供应链风险管理器的可视化工具,它允许检查攻击向量的分类,它们的描述,对现实世界事件和其他文献的引用,以及有关相关保障措施的信息。由于开源本身,社区可以很容易地引用新的攻击,适应全新的攻击向量或反映新的安全措施的发展。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Risk Explorer for Software Supply Chains: Understanding the Attack Surface of Open-Source based Software Development
Supply chain attacks on open-source projects aim at injecting and spreading malicious code such that it is executed by direct and indirect downstream users. Recent work systematized the knowledge about such attacks and proposed a taxonomy in the form of an attack tree. We propose a visualization tool calledRisk Explorer for Software Supply Chains, which allows inspecting the taxonomy of attack vectors, their descriptions, references to real-world incidents and other literature, as well as information about associated safeguards. Being open-source itself, the community can easily reference new attacks, accommodate for entirely new attack vectors or reflect the development of new safeguards.
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