{"title":"针对完全拜占庭对手的有效拜占庭路由的形式化处理","authors":"Siddhant Goenka, Sisi Duan, Haibin Zhang","doi":"10.1109/NCA.2018.8548163","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We describe efficient path-based Byzantine routing protocols that are secure against fully Byzantine adversaries. Our work is in sharp contrast to prior works which handle a weaker subset of Byzantine attacks. We provide a formal proof of correctness of our protocols which, to our knowledge, is the first of its kind. We implement and evaluate our protocols using DeterLab, demonstrating that our protocols are as efficient as those secure against weaker adversaries and our protocols can efficiently and correctly detect routers that fail arbitrarily.","PeriodicalId":268662,"journal":{"name":"2018 IEEE 17th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Formal Treatment of Efficient Byzantine Routing Against Fully Byzantine Adversary\",\"authors\":\"Siddhant Goenka, Sisi Duan, Haibin Zhang\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/NCA.2018.8548163\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We describe efficient path-based Byzantine routing protocols that are secure against fully Byzantine adversaries. Our work is in sharp contrast to prior works which handle a weaker subset of Byzantine attacks. We provide a formal proof of correctness of our protocols which, to our knowledge, is the first of its kind. We implement and evaluate our protocols using DeterLab, demonstrating that our protocols are as efficient as those secure against weaker adversaries and our protocols can efficiently and correctly detect routers that fail arbitrarily.\",\"PeriodicalId\":268662,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2018 IEEE 17th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA)\",\"volume\":\"22 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2018 IEEE 17th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/NCA.2018.8548163\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2018 IEEE 17th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/NCA.2018.8548163","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A Formal Treatment of Efficient Byzantine Routing Against Fully Byzantine Adversary
We describe efficient path-based Byzantine routing protocols that are secure against fully Byzantine adversaries. Our work is in sharp contrast to prior works which handle a weaker subset of Byzantine attacks. We provide a formal proof of correctness of our protocols which, to our knowledge, is the first of its kind. We implement and evaluate our protocols using DeterLab, demonstrating that our protocols are as efficient as those secure against weaker adversaries and our protocols can efficiently and correctly detect routers that fail arbitrarily.