Haohuang Wen, Phillip A. Porras, V. Yegneswaran, Zhiqiang Lin
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引用次数: 3
摘要
-短消息服务(SMS)是现代智能手机通信的基石,可实现人与人之间的文本消息传递和其他基于SMS的服务(例如,双因素认证)。然而,它也很容易被利用来危害毫无戒心的远程受害者。例如,像Simjacker和WIBAttack这样的新漏洞允许传输二进制短信,可以在受害者设备上秘密执行危险命令。SMS通道也可能被破坏以驱动其他恶意活动(例如,垃圾邮件、拒绝服务和跟踪),从而破坏最终用户的安全和隐私。不幸的是,无论是当代的智能手机操作系统还是现有的防御技术都不能提供一个全面的壁垒来抵御不断发展的SMS驱动的威胁。为了解决这一限制,我们开发了一种名为RIL - D EFENDER的新型防御框架,据我们所知,这是第一个集成到Android智能手机无线电接口层(RIL)中的内联防御系统。我们描述了在三种智能手机型号上使用五个Android版本的Android开源项目(AOSP)的R IL D EFENDER的实现,并表明它能够保护用户免受跨越四种对手模型的六种类型的SMS攻击。我们评估了R IL - D EFENDER针对19个复制短信攻击和11个当代短信恶意软件样本,发现R IL - D EFENDER检测所有并自动阻止所有这些威胁,但其中一个不会影响正常的蜂窝操作。
Thwarting Smartphone SMS Attacks at the Radio Interface Layer
—The short message service (SMS) is a cornerstone of modern smartphone communication that enables inter-personal text messaging and other SMS-based services (e.g., two-factor authentication). However, it can also be readily exploited to compromise unsuspecting remote victims. For instance, novel exploits such as Simjacker and WIBAttack enable transmission of binary SMS messages that could surreptitiously execute dangerous commands on a victim device. The SMS channel may also be subverted to drive other nefarious activities (e.g., spamming, DoS, and tracking), thereby undermining end-user security and privacy. Unfortunately, neither contemporary smart- phone operating systems nor existing defense techniques provide a comprehensive bulwark against the spectrum of evolving SMS- driven threats. To address this limitation, we develop a novel defense framework called R IL D EFENDER , which to the best of our knowledge is the first inline prevention system integrated into the radio interface layer (RIL) of Android smartphones. We describe an implementation of R IL D EFENDER on three smartphone models with five Android versions of the Android Open Source Project (AOSP), and show that it is able to protect users from six types of SMS attacks spanning four adversary models. We evaluate R IL D EFENDER against 19 reproduced SMS attacks and 11 contemporary SMS malware samples and find that R IL D EFENDER detects all and automatically prevents all but one of these threats without affecting normal cellular operations.