具有不可否认性的SM9数字签名

Meng Wang, Yihong Long
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引用次数: 0

摘要

SM9是中国国家密码管理局发布的一种基于身份的密码算法。在SM9中,用于签名的用户私钥由称为密钥生成中心(KGC)的中央系统生成。当私钥的拥有者想要通过否认签名是由他自己生成来逃避责任时,他可以声称KGC的操作者使用生成的私钥伪造了签名。为了解决这一问题,本文提出了两种具有不可否认性的SM9数字签名方案。在提出的方案中,用于签名的用户私钥由两个独立的组件协作生成,其中一个部署在私钥服务提供者的站点中,而另一个部署在用户的站点中。私钥只能借助同态加密在用户站点中计算。因此,只有用户可以获得私钥,并且他不能否认签名是由自己生成的。提出的方案可以实现SM9数字签名的不可否认性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
SM9 Digital Signature with Non-repudiation
SM9 is an identity-based cryptography algorithm published by the State Cryptography Administration of China. With SM9, a user's private key for signing is generated by a central system called key generation center (KGC). When the owner of the private key wants to shirk responsibility by denying that the signature was generated by himself, he can claim that the operator of KGC forged the signature using the generated private key. To address this issue, in this paper, two schemes of SM9 digital signature with non-repudiation are proposed. With the proposed schemes, the user's private key for signing is collaboratively generated by two separate components, one of which is deployed in the private key service provider's site while the other is deployed in the user's site. The private key can only be calculated in the user's site with the help of homomorphic encryption. Therefore, only the user can obtain the private key and he cannot deny that the signature was generated by himself. The proposed schemes can achieve the non-repudiation of SM9 digital signature.
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