分离由硬件支持的hypervisor可信计算基础

C. Gebhardt, Chris I. Dalton, A. Tomlinson
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引用次数: 10

摘要

在本文中,我们探讨了如何利用对商品硬件的虚拟化支持的最新进展来减少可信计算基础(TCB)并改进管理程序的代码分离。为了实现这一点,我们重新评估了TCB的定义,并说明了如何通过硬件保护机制强制执行不同代码块的隔离。我们认为,许多基于软件的TCB减少和分离工作可以从利用这些硬件功能中受益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Separating hypervisor trusted computing base supported by hardware
In this paper we explore how recent advances in virtualisation support for commodity hardware could be utilised to reduce the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) and improve the code separation of a hypervisor. To achieve this, we reassess on the definition of the TCB and illustrate how segregation of different code blocks could be enforced by hardware protection mechanisms. We argue that many software-based efforts in TCB reduction and separation can benefit from utilising those hardware capabilities.
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