{"title":"J-SOX实施后盈余与盈余变动分布的不连续性:来自日本的经验证据","authors":"M. Enomoto, Tomoyasu Yamaguchi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2622396","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Prior research finds that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US-SOX) of 2002 has affected earnings management in the United States. Cohen et al. (2008) indicate that accrual-based earnings management has declined since the passage of US-SOX, while real earnings management has increased. Further, Gilliam et al. (2015) show that the zero-earnings discontinuity has disappeared since its passage, indicating that earnings management to avoid losses has decreased as a result. In Japan, the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of 2006, the so-called Japanese version of SOX (J-SOX), was implemented for fiscal years starting in April 2008. Similar to US-SOX, J-SOX aims to reinforce the corporate governance of financial reporting. This study investigates whether the discontinuity in the distributions of earnings and earnings changes disappeared after J-SOX implementation. In contrast to US-SOX, the results indicate that the discontinuity in the earnings distribution at zero did not disappear after J-SOX implementation. However, the discontinuity in the earnings change distribution at zero almost disappeared after J-SOX implementation, indicating that earnings management to avoid earnings decreases became less prevalent. In addition, the results indicate that the discontinuity in the distribution of earnings changes before J-SOX implementation was mainly caused by habitual beaters and that earnings management by habitual beaters to avoid earnings decreases was less prevalent after J-SOX implementation.","PeriodicalId":171289,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"26","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Discontinuities in Earnings and Earnings Change Distributions after J-SOX Implementation: Empirical Evidence from Japan\",\"authors\":\"M. Enomoto, Tomoyasu Yamaguchi\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2622396\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Prior research finds that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US-SOX) of 2002 has affected earnings management in the United States. Cohen et al. (2008) indicate that accrual-based earnings management has declined since the passage of US-SOX, while real earnings management has increased. Further, Gilliam et al. (2015) show that the zero-earnings discontinuity has disappeared since its passage, indicating that earnings management to avoid losses has decreased as a result. In Japan, the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of 2006, the so-called Japanese version of SOX (J-SOX), was implemented for fiscal years starting in April 2008. Similar to US-SOX, J-SOX aims to reinforce the corporate governance of financial reporting. This study investigates whether the discontinuity in the distributions of earnings and earnings changes disappeared after J-SOX implementation. In contrast to US-SOX, the results indicate that the discontinuity in the earnings distribution at zero did not disappear after J-SOX implementation. However, the discontinuity in the earnings change distribution at zero almost disappeared after J-SOX implementation, indicating that earnings management to avoid earnings decreases became less prevalent. In addition, the results indicate that the discontinuity in the distribution of earnings changes before J-SOX implementation was mainly caused by habitual beaters and that earnings management by habitual beaters to avoid earnings decreases was less prevalent after J-SOX implementation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":171289,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Law: Corporate Governance Law eJournal\",\"volume\":\"5 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-10-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"26\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Law: Corporate Governance Law eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2622396\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Law: Corporate Governance Law eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2622396","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 26
摘要
先前的研究发现,2002年的萨班斯-奥克斯利法案(US-SOX)对美国的盈余管理产生了影响。Cohen等人(2008)指出,自US-SOX法案通过以来,基于权责发生制的盈余管理有所下降,而实际盈余管理有所增加。此外,Gilliam et al.(2015)表明,零盈余不连续自其通过以来已经消失,这表明避免损失的盈余管理因此减少。在日本,2006年的金融工具和交易法,即所谓的日本版SOX (J-SOX),从2008年4月开始实施财政年度。与US-SOX类似,J-SOX旨在加强财务报告的公司治理。本研究探讨J-SOX实施后,盈余分配和盈余变动的不连续性是否消失。与US-SOX相比,结果表明J-SOX实施后,零收入分配的不连续并未消失。然而,J-SOX实施后,盈余变化分布在零处的不连续现象几乎消失了,这表明以避免盈余减少为目的的盈余管理变得不那么普遍。此外,研究结果表明,J-SOX法案实施前盈余变化分布的不连续性主要是由习惯性破坏者造成的,J-SOX法案实施后,习惯性破坏者进行盈余管理以避免盈余减少的情况有所减少。
Discontinuities in Earnings and Earnings Change Distributions after J-SOX Implementation: Empirical Evidence from Japan
Prior research finds that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US-SOX) of 2002 has affected earnings management in the United States. Cohen et al. (2008) indicate that accrual-based earnings management has declined since the passage of US-SOX, while real earnings management has increased. Further, Gilliam et al. (2015) show that the zero-earnings discontinuity has disappeared since its passage, indicating that earnings management to avoid losses has decreased as a result. In Japan, the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of 2006, the so-called Japanese version of SOX (J-SOX), was implemented for fiscal years starting in April 2008. Similar to US-SOX, J-SOX aims to reinforce the corporate governance of financial reporting. This study investigates whether the discontinuity in the distributions of earnings and earnings changes disappeared after J-SOX implementation. In contrast to US-SOX, the results indicate that the discontinuity in the earnings distribution at zero did not disappear after J-SOX implementation. However, the discontinuity in the earnings change distribution at zero almost disappeared after J-SOX implementation, indicating that earnings management to avoid earnings decreases became less prevalent. In addition, the results indicate that the discontinuity in the distribution of earnings changes before J-SOX implementation was mainly caused by habitual beaters and that earnings management by habitual beaters to avoid earnings decreases was less prevalent after J-SOX implementation.