风险投资中的战略取消认证

Pierre Mella-Barral
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引用次数: 3

摘要

早期的风险投资财团可以在战略上威胁不参与后续融资。他们的不参与认证会向其他银团发出负面信号,从而降低创业者在后一轮融资中保留战略的价值。在竞争激烈的首轮融资中,具有最高专业技能的银团往往不能完全预先承诺不在后一轮融资中这样做,从而对创业者失去吸引力。战略去证书化促使银团的组成趋向于专业水平的异质性,这就起到了预先承诺的作用。对风险投资的大规模实证分析发现,在早期投资中,银团的异质性水平较高,而在后期投资中则趋于同质性。这与以往的银团形成理论不一致,但与战略去证书化相符。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Strategic Decertification in Venture Capital
Early round VC syndicates can strategically threaten not to participate in a follow-on round of financing. The negative signal their non-pursued certification would send to alternative syndicates reduces the value of the entrepreneur's reservation strategy in the later round. In competitive early rounds, syndicates with highest expertise often cannot fully precommit against doing so in later rounds and become unattractive to entrepreneurs. Strategic decertification drives syndicate composition towards heterogeneity in expertise levels, which acts as a precommitment device. A large scale empirical analysis of VC investments finds that syndicates start out with higher levels of heterogeneity in early rounds and tend towards homogeneity in later rounds. This is inconsistent with previous theories of syndicate formation but consistent with strategic decertification.
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