汽车行业的战略合同关系

Cleiciele Albuquerque Augusto , José Paulo de Souza , Silvio Antônio Ferraz Cário
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引用次数: 9

摘要

本研究的目的是通过交易成本理论、计量成本理论和资源基础观的互补性来理解契约关系。最初,我们试图定义一个适合互补性目标的分析模型,考虑到每种方法的类别。其主张是:由于有可能衡量产品的属性,合同关系可以用来保障对高专用性和战略价值资产的产权,避免垂直整合的成本。其次,进行了定性描述性横切(2014年和2015年)研究。在这一阶段,根据对位于帕拉纳州的汽车制造商及其直接供应商的物流、生产和采购经理的半结构化访谈获得的数据,分析互补性命题。我们的命题表明,当存在度量产品属性的可能性时,契约关系可以用于确保高专用性资产和战略资源的产权,从而避免垂直整合的成本。这一主张得到了验证,因为在高专用性汽车零部件的情况下,其尺寸的可测量性确保了对特定和剩余产权的保护。在战略资源的情况下,当有测量和控制的可能性时,允许承包,甚至包括获得带来竞争优势的创新(蓝牙,集成GPS与SD卡,备用传感器,安全气囊)。有人指出,尽管竞争优势在汽车制造商刚成立时是宝贵和稀有的资源,但这并不妨碍签订合同。验证可以为Williamson提出的理性交易成本理论,以及资源基础观所建议的将垂直整合作为控制战略资源的一种形式提供另一种路径,但这仍需要进一步研究,以克服模型中持续存在的局限性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Strategic contractual relationships in the automotive sector

The aim of the present study is to understand contractual relations through the complementarity of the Transaction Costs Theory, Measurement Costs Theory, and the Resource-Based View. Initially, we sought to define an analytical model appropriate to the complementarity objective, considering the categories of each approach. The proposition was: given the possibility of measuring the attributes of products, the contractual relationship can be used to guarantee property rights over assets of high specificity and strategic value, avoiding the costs of vertical integration. Secondly, a qualitative descriptive cross-cut (2014 and 2015) study was carried out. In this phase, the complementarity proposition was analyzed based on data obtained through semi-structured interviews with logistics, production, and purchasing managers of automakers located in the state of Paraná, and some of their direct suppliers. Our proposition indicates that when there is the possibility of measuring product attributes, the contractual relationship can be used to secure property rights of high-specificity assets and strategic resources, avoiding the costs of vertical integration. This proposition was verified because, in the case of high-specificity auto parts, the measurability of their dimensions ensures protection of specific and residual property rights. In the case of strategic resources, when there is a possibility of measurement and control, contracting is allowed, even including the acquisition of innovations that bring competitive advantage (Bluetooth, integrated GPS with SD card, back-up sensor, air bags). It was observed that, even though competitive advantages constitute valuable and rare resources for automakers at their launch, this did not prevent contracting. Verification can offer an alternative path to rational Transaction Costs Theory, as proposed by Williamson, and the use of vertical integration as a form of controlling strategic resources, recommended by the Resource-Based View, which still requires further studies in order to overcome persistent limitations in the model.

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