{"title":"4. 战略游戏的核心","authors":"P. Chander","doi":"10.7312/chan18464-005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces and studies the γ-core of a general strategic game. It shows that a prominent class of games admit nonempty γ-cores. It also shows that the γ-core payoff vectors (a cooperative solution concept) can be supported as equilibrium outcomes of a non-cooperative game and the grand coalition is the unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the γ-core is nonempty. As an application of this result, it shows that the γ-core of an oligopoly game is nonempty and, therefore, the oligopoly may become a monopoly unless prevented by law. JEL classification numbers: C71-73, D43, L13","PeriodicalId":321819,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory and Climate Change","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"4. THE CORE OF A STRATEGIC GAME\",\"authors\":\"P. Chander\",\"doi\":\"10.7312/chan18464-005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper introduces and studies the γ-core of a general strategic game. It shows that a prominent class of games admit nonempty γ-cores. It also shows that the γ-core payoff vectors (a cooperative solution concept) can be supported as equilibrium outcomes of a non-cooperative game and the grand coalition is the unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the γ-core is nonempty. As an application of this result, it shows that the γ-core of an oligopoly game is nonempty and, therefore, the oligopoly may become a monopoly unless prevented by law. JEL classification numbers: C71-73, D43, L13\",\"PeriodicalId\":321819,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Game Theory and Climate Change\",\"volume\":\"95 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-12-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Game Theory and Climate Change\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.7312/chan18464-005\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Game Theory and Climate Change","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7312/chan18464-005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper introduces and studies the γ-core of a general strategic game. It shows that a prominent class of games admit nonempty γ-cores. It also shows that the γ-core payoff vectors (a cooperative solution concept) can be supported as equilibrium outcomes of a non-cooperative game and the grand coalition is the unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the γ-core is nonempty. As an application of this result, it shows that the γ-core of an oligopoly game is nonempty and, therefore, the oligopoly may become a monopoly unless prevented by law. JEL classification numbers: C71-73, D43, L13
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