失败收购的纪律作用和公司治理的变化

M. Bugeja, Yaowen Shan, Yanglan Zu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究考察了不成功的收购是否会引发董事更换和其他治理属性的变化,并导致目标公司绩效的改善。本研究利用澳大利亚的样本发现,在竞标失败后,目标公司更有可能撤换董事,董事所有权、董事会独立性和大股东所有权也会增加。相反,收购失败后,目标公司董事的专业知识和声望下降。我们还发现,收购后的会计核算和目标公司的股票表现在很大程度上与收购失败后公司治理属性的变化无关。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The disciplinary role of unsuccessful takeovers and changes in corporate governance
This study examines if unsuccessful takeovers trigger the replacement of directors and changes in other governance attributes and result in improvements in target firm performance. Using an Australian sample this study finds that following failed bids, target firms are more likely to remove directors and experience an increase in director ownership, board independence, and block ownership. In contrast, target firm director expertise and prestige decrease following failed bids. We also find that post‐bid accounting and stock performance of targets are largely unrelated to changes in governance attributes after the unsuccessful takeover.
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