{"title":"重构程序以确保信息流的安全","authors":"Scott F. Smith, M. Thober","doi":"10.1145/1134744.1134758","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Adding a sound information flow security policy to an existing program is a difficult task that requires major analysis of andchanges to the program. In this paper we show how refactoring programs into distinct components of high and low security is a useful methodology to aid in the production of programs with sound information flow policies. Our methodology proceeds as follows. Given a program with no information flow controls, a program sliceris used to identify code that depends on high security inputs. High security code so identified is then refactored into a separate component, which may be accessed by the low security component via public method calls. A security policy that labels input data and checks the output points can then enforce the desired end-to-end security property. Controlled information releases can occur at explicit declassification points if deemed safe. The result is a well-engineered program with explicit interfaces between components of different security levels.","PeriodicalId":119000,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2006-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"36","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Refactoring programs to secure information flows\",\"authors\":\"Scott F. Smith, M. Thober\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/1134744.1134758\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Adding a sound information flow security policy to an existing program is a difficult task that requires major analysis of andchanges to the program. In this paper we show how refactoring programs into distinct components of high and low security is a useful methodology to aid in the production of programs with sound information flow policies. Our methodology proceeds as follows. Given a program with no information flow controls, a program sliceris used to identify code that depends on high security inputs. High security code so identified is then refactored into a separate component, which may be accessed by the low security component via public method calls. A security policy that labels input data and checks the output points can then enforce the desired end-to-end security property. Controlled information releases can occur at explicit declassification points if deemed safe. The result is a well-engineered program with explicit interfaces between components of different security levels.\",\"PeriodicalId\":119000,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ACM Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security\",\"volume\":\"65 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2006-06-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"36\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ACM Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/1134744.1134758\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACM Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1134744.1134758","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Adding a sound information flow security policy to an existing program is a difficult task that requires major analysis of andchanges to the program. In this paper we show how refactoring programs into distinct components of high and low security is a useful methodology to aid in the production of programs with sound information flow policies. Our methodology proceeds as follows. Given a program with no information flow controls, a program sliceris used to identify code that depends on high security inputs. High security code so identified is then refactored into a separate component, which may be accessed by the low security component via public method calls. A security policy that labels input data and checks the output points can then enforce the desired end-to-end security property. Controlled information releases can occur at explicit declassification points if deemed safe. The result is a well-engineered program with explicit interfaces between components of different security levels.