Wei Liu, Hua Xiao Hao, Lan Ai Wan, Kai Xu, Mu Han, Long Xiao Zhu
{"title":"一种基于NTRU代理密钥的对称加性同态加密方案","authors":"Wei Liu, Hua Xiao Hao, Lan Ai Wan, Kai Xu, Mu Han, Long Xiao Zhu","doi":"10.1145/3584714.3584720","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"To address the problems that homomorphic encryption cannot achieve secret sharing and existing Paillier cryptosystems cannot resist quantum attacks and are not suitable for scenarios where encrypted data is only uploaded by the data owner, this paper designs an NTRU (number theory research unit) based symmetric additive homomorphic encryption-proxy rekey (PAHE-PRK) scheme using the ideas of proxy rekeying and symmetric encryption based on the approximate convention number problem and the ring fault-tolerant learning problem. research unit) Proxy ReKey-based Symmetric Additive Homomorphic Encryption scheme (Partially Additive Homomorphic Encryption-Proxy ReKey, PAHE-PRK). The proxy can not only perform homomorphic computation on the original ciphertext, but also re-encrypt the homomorphic key so that the trusted user can obtain the homomorphic key to decrypt the ciphertext, thus achieving secret sharing and privacy protection. Finally, the performance and security of the proposed scheme are discussed in comparison with the traditional Paillier cryptosystem and the proxy re-encryption scheme based on the fault-tolerant learning problem, showing that the proposed scheme is faster in encryption and decryption, has less computation and storage overhead, and is resistant to the indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA).","PeriodicalId":112952,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2022 International Conference on Cyber Security","volume":"422 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A symmetric additive homomorphic encryption scheme based on NTRU proxy rekeys\",\"authors\":\"Wei Liu, Hua Xiao Hao, Lan Ai Wan, Kai Xu, Mu Han, Long Xiao Zhu\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3584714.3584720\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"To address the problems that homomorphic encryption cannot achieve secret sharing and existing Paillier cryptosystems cannot resist quantum attacks and are not suitable for scenarios where encrypted data is only uploaded by the data owner, this paper designs an NTRU (number theory research unit) based symmetric additive homomorphic encryption-proxy rekey (PAHE-PRK) scheme using the ideas of proxy rekeying and symmetric encryption based on the approximate convention number problem and the ring fault-tolerant learning problem. research unit) Proxy ReKey-based Symmetric Additive Homomorphic Encryption scheme (Partially Additive Homomorphic Encryption-Proxy ReKey, PAHE-PRK). The proxy can not only perform homomorphic computation on the original ciphertext, but also re-encrypt the homomorphic key so that the trusted user can obtain the homomorphic key to decrypt the ciphertext, thus achieving secret sharing and privacy protection. Finally, the performance and security of the proposed scheme are discussed in comparison with the traditional Paillier cryptosystem and the proxy re-encryption scheme based on the fault-tolerant learning problem, showing that the proposed scheme is faster in encryption and decryption, has less computation and storage overhead, and is resistant to the indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA).\",\"PeriodicalId\":112952,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2022 International Conference on Cyber Security\",\"volume\":\"422 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-12-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2022 International Conference on Cyber Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3584714.3584720\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2022 International Conference on Cyber Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3584714.3584720","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A symmetric additive homomorphic encryption scheme based on NTRU proxy rekeys
To address the problems that homomorphic encryption cannot achieve secret sharing and existing Paillier cryptosystems cannot resist quantum attacks and are not suitable for scenarios where encrypted data is only uploaded by the data owner, this paper designs an NTRU (number theory research unit) based symmetric additive homomorphic encryption-proxy rekey (PAHE-PRK) scheme using the ideas of proxy rekeying and symmetric encryption based on the approximate convention number problem and the ring fault-tolerant learning problem. research unit) Proxy ReKey-based Symmetric Additive Homomorphic Encryption scheme (Partially Additive Homomorphic Encryption-Proxy ReKey, PAHE-PRK). The proxy can not only perform homomorphic computation on the original ciphertext, but also re-encrypt the homomorphic key so that the trusted user can obtain the homomorphic key to decrypt the ciphertext, thus achieving secret sharing and privacy protection. Finally, the performance and security of the proposed scheme are discussed in comparison with the traditional Paillier cryptosystem and the proxy re-encryption scheme based on the fault-tolerant learning problem, showing that the proposed scheme is faster in encryption and decryption, has less computation and storage overhead, and is resistant to the indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA).