俾斯麦无效:生育率下降与普鲁士社会保险的引入

Timothy W. Guinnane, Jochen Streb
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引用次数: 0

摘要

长期以来,经济学家一直认为引入社会保险将降低生育率。这一假设依赖于标准模型:如果孩子之所以受欢迎,部分原因是他们在残疾或年老时提供了保障,那么,针对这些事件提供保险的国家计划,应该会促使夫妇在分配财富时放弃孩子。我们用19世纪80年代和90年代德国社会保险的引入来检验这一说法。俾斯麦的社会保险制度为大多数劳动人口提供了医疗保险、工伤保险和老年养老金。德国的案例之所以有吸引力,是因为社会保险计划开始时规模很大,对所覆盖的工人阶层是强制性的,而且这一时期德国的生育率仍然相对较高。聚焦于普鲁士的状态,我们估计差异中的差异模型,该模型询问婚姻和婚姻生育率是否对主要社会保险计划的引入或扩展做出反应。对于整个普鲁士,我们发现影响很小。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Bismarck to No Effect: Fertility Decline and the Introduction of Social Insurance in Prussia
Economists have long argued that introducing social insurance will reduce fertility. The hypothesis relies on standard models: if children are desirable in part because they provide security in case of disability or old age, then state programs that provide insurance against these events should induce couples to substitute away from children in the allocation of wealth. We test this claim using the introduction of social insurance in Germany in the 1880s and 1890s. Bismarck's social-insurance system provided health insurance, workplace-accident insurance, and old age pensions to a majority of the working population. The German case appeals because the social insurance program started on a large scale and was compulsory for covered classes of workers, and because fertility in Germany in this period was still relatively high. Focusing on the state of Prussia, we estimate differences-in-differences models that ask whether marriage and marital fertility reacted to the introduction or extension of the main social insurance programs. For Prussia as a whole we find little impact.
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