欧洲私营企业规模管理以减少信息披露的专有成本

Darren Bernard, D. Burgstahler, Devrimi Kaya
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引用次数: 75

摘要

我们研究了欧洲私营公司的规模管理,披露要求在规模阈值上增加。我们的估计表明,在接近要求披露损益表的门槛的公司中,至少有8%的公司降低了规模,而管理规模的公司平均牺牲了6%以上的资产。我们发现,专有成本的多个决定因素预测了这种行为,并且规模管理以避免强制性审计(类似地在规模阈值上施加强制审计)具有可比的规模。我们的结果在很大程度上没有混淆资本市场、代理或合规成本的情况下,对专有成本的经济意义进行了三角测量。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Size Management by European Private Firms to Minimize Proprietary Costs of Disclosure
We examine size management by European private firms for which disclosure requirements increase at size thresholds. Our estimates suggest at least 8% of firms near thresholds that impose income statement disclosure manage size downward, and the average firm that manages size sacrifices more than 6% of its assets. We find that multiple determinants of proprietary costs predict this behavior, and that size management to avoid mandatory audits, which are similarly imposed at size thresholds, is of comparable magnitude. Our results triangulate the economic significance of proprietary costs in a setting largely without confounding capital market, agency, or compliance costs.
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