入侵容忍认证机构系统评估框架

Jingqiang Lin, Jiwu Jing, Peng Liu
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引用次数: 3

摘要

最近提出了各种可容忍入侵的证书颁发机构(CA)系统来提供抗攻击的证书更新/查询服务。然而,由于系统组织、阈值加密方案、协议和使用场景的多样性,很难直接对它们进行比较。本文提出了一个入侵容忍CA系统评估框架,该框架由三个部分组成,即入侵容忍CA模型、威胁模型和比较评估度量。该框架涵盖了系统组织、协议、使用场景、证书有效期、撤销率和平均恢复时间(MTTR)。基于该框架,在三种典型使用场景下对四种具有代表性的CA系统进行了评估和比较,得出了合理而深刻的结果。研究了使用场景和系统特性之间的相互依赖关系,为不同使用场景设计更好的系统提供了指导。该框架为定量评估入侵容忍CA系统提供了有效的方法。此外,比较结果为进一步提高入侵容忍CA系统的攻击弹性提供了有价值的见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Framework for Intrusion Tolerant Certification Authority System Evaluation
Various intrusion tolerant certification authority (CA) systems have been recently proposed to provide attack resistant certificate update/query services. However, it is difficult to compare them against each other directly due to diversity in system organizations, threshold cryptography schemes, protocols and usage scenarios. We present a framework for intrusion tolerant CA system evaluation, which consists of three components, namely, an intrusion tolerant CA model, a threat model and a metric for comparative evaluation. The framework covers system organizations, protocols, usage scenarios, period of certificate validity, revocation rate and mean time to recovery (MTTR). Based on the framework, four representative CA systems are evaluated and compared in three typical usage scenarios, producing reasonable and insightful results. The inter-dependency between usage scenarios and system characteristics is investigated, providing a guideline to design better systems for different usage scenarios. The proposed framework provides an effective method to evaluate intrusion tolerant CA systems quantitatively. Moreover, the comparison results offer valuable insights to further improve the attack resilience of intrusion tolerant CA systems.
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