{"title":"无声的景象:战时的声音、空战和视觉的极限","authors":"Yaron Jean","doi":"10.2478/9783110623758-014","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The evolution of modern warfare technology and its sensual array frequently rely on two core elements: the level of progress achieved in a given country and the prevalent notion of the future war.1 The war that broke out in Europe in summer 1914 combined these elements in a horrible fashion. Most of the warring countries had not foreseen any future war in terms of a global conflict. Consequently, in early twentieth century Europe, concepts of military technology were rather limited in comparison to other developments at the time in areas such as commerce and civil engineering. Strategists viewed modern technology in terms of a one-dimensional battlefield; its major purpose was to facilitate a limited engagement consisting of a series of swift, knockout victories. Imperial Germany, for instance, derived most of its pre-World War I combat experience from the Napoleonic wars and the German wars of liberation. Ironically, at least from the standpoint of its military equipment, the German army of 1914 strongly resembled the one of the 1860s. Breech loading firearms, bayonets, horses, and frontal engagement still dominated the mind-set of the early twentiethcentury military.2 It is an open secret, however, that many of the warfare technologies that were used in World War I had seen some action outside Europe during the last third of the nineteenth century.3 The ironclad ships and the dreadnoughts were products of the Crimean War. The utilization of submarines, torpedo boats, mines and machine guns traces back to the American Civil War and the Russo-Japanese War.4 The Aeroplane flew first in 1903 in the United States and Zeppelins became a German symbol of power over the continent from the late nineteenth century.5 Despite this fact, they were not mass produced. Advanced military technology was still considered a prerequisite for supporting the traditional maxima. In short, the cavalry should light the way and the infantry was supposed to win the way.6 The outbreak of hostilities in Europe in August 1914 created a gap between the actual combat situation and the way it was experienced. Those who were mobilized","PeriodicalId":166006,"journal":{"name":"Borderlines: Essays on Mapping and The Logic of Place","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Muted Spectacles: Wartime Sounds, Aerial Warfare, and the Limits of the Visual\",\"authors\":\"Yaron Jean\",\"doi\":\"10.2478/9783110623758-014\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The evolution of modern warfare technology and its sensual array frequently rely on two core elements: the level of progress achieved in a given country and the prevalent notion of the future war.1 The war that broke out in Europe in summer 1914 combined these elements in a horrible fashion. Most of the warring countries had not foreseen any future war in terms of a global conflict. Consequently, in early twentieth century Europe, concepts of military technology were rather limited in comparison to other developments at the time in areas such as commerce and civil engineering. Strategists viewed modern technology in terms of a one-dimensional battlefield; its major purpose was to facilitate a limited engagement consisting of a series of swift, knockout victories. Imperial Germany, for instance, derived most of its pre-World War I combat experience from the Napoleonic wars and the German wars of liberation. Ironically, at least from the standpoint of its military equipment, the German army of 1914 strongly resembled the one of the 1860s. Breech loading firearms, bayonets, horses, and frontal engagement still dominated the mind-set of the early twentiethcentury military.2 It is an open secret, however, that many of the warfare technologies that were used in World War I had seen some action outside Europe during the last third of the nineteenth century.3 The ironclad ships and the dreadnoughts were products of the Crimean War. The utilization of submarines, torpedo boats, mines and machine guns traces back to the American Civil War and the Russo-Japanese War.4 The Aeroplane flew first in 1903 in the United States and Zeppelins became a German symbol of power over the continent from the late nineteenth century.5 Despite this fact, they were not mass produced. Advanced military technology was still considered a prerequisite for supporting the traditional maxima. In short, the cavalry should light the way and the infantry was supposed to win the way.6 The outbreak of hostilities in Europe in August 1914 created a gap between the actual combat situation and the way it was experienced. Those who were mobilized\",\"PeriodicalId\":166006,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Borderlines: Essays on Mapping and The Logic of Place\",\"volume\":\"67 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-12-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Borderlines: Essays on Mapping and The Logic of Place\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2478/9783110623758-014\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Borderlines: Essays on Mapping and The Logic of Place","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2478/9783110623758-014","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Muted Spectacles: Wartime Sounds, Aerial Warfare, and the Limits of the Visual
The evolution of modern warfare technology and its sensual array frequently rely on two core elements: the level of progress achieved in a given country and the prevalent notion of the future war.1 The war that broke out in Europe in summer 1914 combined these elements in a horrible fashion. Most of the warring countries had not foreseen any future war in terms of a global conflict. Consequently, in early twentieth century Europe, concepts of military technology were rather limited in comparison to other developments at the time in areas such as commerce and civil engineering. Strategists viewed modern technology in terms of a one-dimensional battlefield; its major purpose was to facilitate a limited engagement consisting of a series of swift, knockout victories. Imperial Germany, for instance, derived most of its pre-World War I combat experience from the Napoleonic wars and the German wars of liberation. Ironically, at least from the standpoint of its military equipment, the German army of 1914 strongly resembled the one of the 1860s. Breech loading firearms, bayonets, horses, and frontal engagement still dominated the mind-set of the early twentiethcentury military.2 It is an open secret, however, that many of the warfare technologies that were used in World War I had seen some action outside Europe during the last third of the nineteenth century.3 The ironclad ships and the dreadnoughts were products of the Crimean War. The utilization of submarines, torpedo boats, mines and machine guns traces back to the American Civil War and the Russo-Japanese War.4 The Aeroplane flew first in 1903 in the United States and Zeppelins became a German symbol of power over the continent from the late nineteenth century.5 Despite this fact, they were not mass produced. Advanced military technology was still considered a prerequisite for supporting the traditional maxima. In short, the cavalry should light the way and the infantry was supposed to win the way.6 The outbreak of hostilities in Europe in August 1914 created a gap between the actual combat situation and the way it was experienced. Those who were mobilized