异构信道频谱共享的保留价格拍卖

M. Khaledi, A. Abouzeid
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引用次数: 8

摘要

认知无线电是一种新的通信模式,它允许认知无线电用户动态地利用许可频谱,从而显著提高频谱利用率。为此,研究有效的频谱分配机制势在必行。本文研究了一个由一个主频谱所有者(PO)、多个主用户(PU)和多个辅助用户(SU)组成的认知无线网络。我们提出了一种认知无线电网络频谱共享的底价拍卖机制,其中su出价从PO处购买频谱频段,PO作为拍卖人,出售闲置的频谱频段以获得利润。与大多数现有的假设相同渠道的拍卖机制不同,我们考虑了一个更一般、更现实的情况,即渠道具有不同的质量。此外,还允许su分别表达它们对每个通道的偏好。也就是说,每个SU提交一个投标向量,每个通道一个。此外,与渠道质量成比例的预订价格由PO施加。提议的拍卖机制导致了有效的分配,在保留价格约束下最大化了SUs的估值,并且我们在分析中正式证明了它具有理想的经济性质。数值结果表明,与具有相同渠道的保留价格拍卖和没有保留价格拍卖相比,该方法的性能有所提高。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Reserve Price Auction for Spectrum Sharing with Heterogeneous Channels
Cognitive radio is a novel communication paradigm that can significantly improve spectrum utilization by allowing the cognitive radio users to dynamically utilize the licensed spectrum. To achieve this, studying efficient spectrum allocation mechanisms is imperative. In this paper, we consider a cognitive radio network consisting of a primary spectrum owner (PO), multiple primary users (PU) and multiple secondary users (SU). We propose a reserve price auction mechanism for spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks where the SUs bid to buy spectrum bands from the PO who acts as the auctioneer, selling idle spectrum bands to make a profit. Unlike most existing auction mechanisms that assume identical channels, we consider a more general and more realistic case where channels have different qualities. Also, SUs are allowed to express their preferences for each channel separately. That is, each SU submits a vector of bids, one for each channel. In addition, reservation prices that are proportional to channel qualities are imposed by the PO. The proposed auction mechanism results in efficient allocation that maximizes SUs' valuations subject to reserve price constraints, and it has desired economic properties that we formally prove in the analysis. Numerical results show performance improvements compared to the case of reserve price auction with identical channels and the case of having no reservation prices.
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