{"title":"加固二进制文件,防止出现更多内存错误","authors":"Gregory J. Duck, Yuntong Zhang, R. Yap","doi":"10.1145/3492321.3519580","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Memory errors, such as buffer overflows and use-after-free, remain the root cause of many security vulnerabilities in modern software. The use of closed source software further exacerbates the problem, as source-based memory error mitigation cannot be applied. While many memory error detection tools exist, most are based on a single error detection methodology with resulting known limitations, such as incomplete memory error detection (redzones) or false error detections (low-fat pointers). In this paper we introduce RedFat, a memory error hardening tool for stripped binaries that is fast, practical and scalable. The core idea behind RedFat is to combine complementary error detection methodologies---redzones and low-fat pointers---in order to detect more memory errors that can be detected by each individual methodology alone. However, complementary error detection also inherits the limitations of each approach, such as false error detections from low-fat pointers. To mitigate this, we introduce a profile-based analysis that automatically determines the strongest memory error protection possible without negative side effects. We implement RedFat on top of a scalable binary rewriting framework, and demonstrate low overheads compared to the current state-of-the-art. We show RedFat to be language agnostic on C/C++/Fortran binaries with minimal requirements, and works with stripped binaries for both position independent/dependent code. We also show that the RedFat instrumentation can scale to very large/complex binaries, such as Google Chrome.","PeriodicalId":196414,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Seventeenth European Conference on Computer Systems","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Hardening binaries against more memory errors\",\"authors\":\"Gregory J. Duck, Yuntong Zhang, R. Yap\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3492321.3519580\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Memory errors, such as buffer overflows and use-after-free, remain the root cause of many security vulnerabilities in modern software. The use of closed source software further exacerbates the problem, as source-based memory error mitigation cannot be applied. While many memory error detection tools exist, most are based on a single error detection methodology with resulting known limitations, such as incomplete memory error detection (redzones) or false error detections (low-fat pointers). In this paper we introduce RedFat, a memory error hardening tool for stripped binaries that is fast, practical and scalable. The core idea behind RedFat is to combine complementary error detection methodologies---redzones and low-fat pointers---in order to detect more memory errors that can be detected by each individual methodology alone. However, complementary error detection also inherits the limitations of each approach, such as false error detections from low-fat pointers. To mitigate this, we introduce a profile-based analysis that automatically determines the strongest memory error protection possible without negative side effects. We implement RedFat on top of a scalable binary rewriting framework, and demonstrate low overheads compared to the current state-of-the-art. We show RedFat to be language agnostic on C/C++/Fortran binaries with minimal requirements, and works with stripped binaries for both position independent/dependent code. 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引用次数: 3
摘要
内存错误,如缓冲区溢出和自由后使用,仍然是现代软件中许多安全漏洞的根本原因。使用闭源软件进一步加剧了这个问题,因为不能应用基于源的内存错误缓解。虽然存在许多内存错误检测工具,但大多数都基于单一的错误检测方法,从而导致已知的局限性,例如不完整的内存错误检测(红区)或错误的错误检测(低脂指针)。在本文中,我们介绍了RedFat,一个快速,实用和可扩展的内存错误强化工具。RedFat背后的核心思想是结合互补的错误检测方法——红区和低脂指针——以检测更多的内存错误,这些错误可以由每个单独的方法检测到。然而,互补错误检测也继承了每种方法的局限性,例如来自低脂指针的错误错误检测。为了减轻这种情况,我们引入了一种基于配置文件的分析,它可以自动确定可能的最强内存错误保护,而不会产生负面影响。我们在一个可扩展的二进制重写框架之上实现了RedFat,并且与当前最先进的技术相比,它的开销很低。我们展示了RedFat对C/ c++ /Fortran二进制文件具有最小要求的语言无关性,并且可以处理位置独立/依赖代码的剥离二进制文件。我们还展示了RedFat工具可以扩展到非常大/复杂的二进制文件,例如Google Chrome。
Memory errors, such as buffer overflows and use-after-free, remain the root cause of many security vulnerabilities in modern software. The use of closed source software further exacerbates the problem, as source-based memory error mitigation cannot be applied. While many memory error detection tools exist, most are based on a single error detection methodology with resulting known limitations, such as incomplete memory error detection (redzones) or false error detections (low-fat pointers). In this paper we introduce RedFat, a memory error hardening tool for stripped binaries that is fast, practical and scalable. The core idea behind RedFat is to combine complementary error detection methodologies---redzones and low-fat pointers---in order to detect more memory errors that can be detected by each individual methodology alone. However, complementary error detection also inherits the limitations of each approach, such as false error detections from low-fat pointers. To mitigate this, we introduce a profile-based analysis that automatically determines the strongest memory error protection possible without negative side effects. We implement RedFat on top of a scalable binary rewriting framework, and demonstrate low overheads compared to the current state-of-the-art. We show RedFat to be language agnostic on C/C++/Fortran binaries with minimal requirements, and works with stripped binaries for both position independent/dependent code. We also show that the RedFat instrumentation can scale to very large/complex binaries, such as Google Chrome.