Disconnection of External and Internal in the Conscious Experience of Schizophrenia: Phenomenological Literary and Neuroanatomical Archaeologies of Self.

Patients with schizophrenia demonstrate an inability to distinguish internal from external sources of some experiences. Although there are numerous models, the causes and neural substrates are largely unknown. In schizophrenia, the commonsensical overlapping oppositions of internal/external, self/other, active/passive, mind/body, voluntary/involuntary become disentangled. Due to the loss of common sense, the imprecise coincidence of these oppositions inner and self, outer and other, mind and body lose their obviousness to the patient. Once the nexus of oppositions is unraveled, the patient tries to recover order by keeping the oppositions clear and separate in delusional interpretations of reality. The patient counters with delusional schemes that artificially keep these oppositions from merging. However, this web of proximate and overlapping oppositions lost to the patient not only inform the way we describe our everyday experience but also implicitly guide our conceptual models in psychology and neuroscience. Their source is a resilient but also protective common sense. Phenomenological method brackets the oppositions of common sense to study the otherwise concealed structures of consciousness. However, when applied to schizophrenia as a disorder of consciousness, phenomenology is burdened by controversy between two approaches: the Apollonian and Dionysian. Both traditions propose that the loss of common sense (in which the paradoxes and contradictions implicit to everyday experience are "overlooked" (von Weizsaecker)) is core to schizophrenia. Experience no longer rests on what is assumed to be probable (Blankenburg), but only proceeds in staccato, what must be, or delusional certainty. The Apollonian approach (Minkowski, Sass, Cutting) claims that the destruction of common sense in schizophrenia comes from above, melting under the scrutiny of an intact but too intense "hyperreflection." The Dionysian approach (Binswanger, Blankenburg, von Weizsaecker) attributes the erosion of common sense, coming from below, to a disruption of pre-attentive, automatic processing. The patient attempts to piece together experience by means of delusions in terms of the remaining fragments. However, both traditions have not been directly studied experimentally. The Apollonian model is hard