{"title":"和安布罗斯·比尔斯一起掷骰子","authors":"G. Kanner","doi":"10.1080/00947598.2002.10394770","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Supreme Court tells us, as a matter of law, that a moratorium is not a taking per se, not even when it extends over a period of several years, allows the affected land owners no economically rational land use, and leaves them only with their obligation to pay property taxes and make mortgage payments. I, a barefoot country lawyer, find this quite confusing because in 1987, in the First English case, the court held quite the opposite, that a denial of viable economic use of land for a similarly long period of time can be a taking per se requiring payment of just compensation. And so, since my meager intellectual resources are probably unequal to the task of plumbing this mystery, I leave to my colleagues the task of parsing Justice Stevens's reasoning in the Tahoe-Sierra case. For the moment I have had my fill of scrutinizing this intellectual shell game, though I have been known to indulge in such activity (Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law? 30 The Urban Lawyer 307 (1998)).","PeriodicalId":154411,"journal":{"name":"Land Use Law & Zoning Digest","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2002-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Rolling the Dice with Ambrose Bierce\",\"authors\":\"G. Kanner\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/00947598.2002.10394770\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract The Supreme Court tells us, as a matter of law, that a moratorium is not a taking per se, not even when it extends over a period of several years, allows the affected land owners no economically rational land use, and leaves them only with their obligation to pay property taxes and make mortgage payments. I, a barefoot country lawyer, find this quite confusing because in 1987, in the First English case, the court held quite the opposite, that a denial of viable economic use of land for a similarly long period of time can be a taking per se requiring payment of just compensation. And so, since my meager intellectual resources are probably unequal to the task of plumbing this mystery, I leave to my colleagues the task of parsing Justice Stevens's reasoning in the Tahoe-Sierra case. For the moment I have had my fill of scrutinizing this intellectual shell game, though I have been known to indulge in such activity (Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law? 30 The Urban Lawyer 307 (1998)).\",\"PeriodicalId\":154411,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Land Use Law & Zoning Digest\",\"volume\":\"2 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2002-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Land Use Law & Zoning Digest\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/00947598.2002.10394770\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Land Use Law & Zoning Digest","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00947598.2002.10394770","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The Supreme Court tells us, as a matter of law, that a moratorium is not a taking per se, not even when it extends over a period of several years, allows the affected land owners no economically rational land use, and leaves them only with their obligation to pay property taxes and make mortgage payments. I, a barefoot country lawyer, find this quite confusing because in 1987, in the First English case, the court held quite the opposite, that a denial of viable economic use of land for a similarly long period of time can be a taking per se requiring payment of just compensation. And so, since my meager intellectual resources are probably unequal to the task of plumbing this mystery, I leave to my colleagues the task of parsing Justice Stevens's reasoning in the Tahoe-Sierra case. For the moment I have had my fill of scrutinizing this intellectual shell game, though I have been known to indulge in such activity (Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law? 30 The Urban Lawyer 307 (1998)).