税务审计作为一种公共产品博弈:惩罚与合规的实验研究

Li‐Chen Hsu
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引用次数: 4

摘要

以往关于偷税漏税的实验研究一般假设预算和审计概率是外生给定的,忽略了纳税人发现偷税漏税的激励和在这种激励下的合规行为。本文的实验证据表明,平均而言,受试者愿意将其税收收入的20%至30%用于审计。如果主体能够确定预算,从而确定审计的可能性,那么遵从性也会大大提高。这些发现表明,考虑纳税人发现逃税的动机对于设计合规改进审计方案非常重要。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Tax Auditing as a Public Good Game: An Experimental Study on Punishment and Compliance
Prior experimental studies on tax evasion generally assume that the budget and the probability of audit are exogenously given, and ignore taxpayers' incentives to detect evasion and their compliance behaviour under such incentives. The experimental evidence of the present paper shows that, on average, subjects are willing to spend 20 to 30% of their tax revenue on auditing. Compliance is also greatly improved if subjects can determine the budget and, hence, the probability of audit. These findings suggest that taking taxpayers' incentives to detect evasion into consideration is important for the design of compliance‐improvement audit schemes.
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