{"title":"网络隐蔽信道的容量估计与可审计性","authors":"B. Venkatraman, R. Newman","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1995.398932","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Classical covert channel analysis has focused on channels available on a single computer: timing channels and storage channels. We characterize network covert channels. Potential network covert channels are exploited by modulating transmission characteristics. We distinguish between spatial covert channels, caused by a variation in the relative volume of communication between nodes in the network, and temporal covert channels caused by a variation in transmission characteristics over time, extending the work of Girling (1987). A model for obtaining a spatially neutral transmission schedule was given by Newman-Wolfe and Venkatraman (1991, 1992). Temporally neutral transmissions are characterized and scheduling policies to generate temporally neutral transmission schedules were given by Venkatraman and Newman-Wolfe (1993). We estimate the covert channel capacity using an adaptive scheduling policy, modeling the system as a mode secure system. Based on our measurements on the University of Florida campus-wide backbone network (UFNET), we discuss the auditability of network covert channels and suggest some handling policies to reduce the capacity of these covert channels to TCSEC acceptable levels.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":420458,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"1197 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1995-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"43","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Capacity estimation and auditability of network covert channels\",\"authors\":\"B. Venkatraman, R. Newman\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/SECPRI.1995.398932\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Classical covert channel analysis has focused on channels available on a single computer: timing channels and storage channels. We characterize network covert channels. Potential network covert channels are exploited by modulating transmission characteristics. We distinguish between spatial covert channels, caused by a variation in the relative volume of communication between nodes in the network, and temporal covert channels caused by a variation in transmission characteristics over time, extending the work of Girling (1987). A model for obtaining a spatially neutral transmission schedule was given by Newman-Wolfe and Venkatraman (1991, 1992). Temporally neutral transmissions are characterized and scheduling policies to generate temporally neutral transmission schedules were given by Venkatraman and Newman-Wolfe (1993). We estimate the covert channel capacity using an adaptive scheduling policy, modeling the system as a mode secure system. Based on our measurements on the University of Florida campus-wide backbone network (UFNET), we discuss the auditability of network covert channels and suggest some handling policies to reduce the capacity of these covert channels to TCSEC acceptable levels.<<ETX>>\",\"PeriodicalId\":420458,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy\",\"volume\":\"1197 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1995-05-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"43\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1995.398932\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1995.398932","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Capacity estimation and auditability of network covert channels
Classical covert channel analysis has focused on channels available on a single computer: timing channels and storage channels. We characterize network covert channels. Potential network covert channels are exploited by modulating transmission characteristics. We distinguish between spatial covert channels, caused by a variation in the relative volume of communication between nodes in the network, and temporal covert channels caused by a variation in transmission characteristics over time, extending the work of Girling (1987). A model for obtaining a spatially neutral transmission schedule was given by Newman-Wolfe and Venkatraman (1991, 1992). Temporally neutral transmissions are characterized and scheduling policies to generate temporally neutral transmission schedules were given by Venkatraman and Newman-Wolfe (1993). We estimate the covert channel capacity using an adaptive scheduling policy, modeling the system as a mode secure system. Based on our measurements on the University of Florida campus-wide backbone network (UFNET), we discuss the auditability of network covert channels and suggest some handling policies to reduce the capacity of these covert channels to TCSEC acceptable levels.<>