公式分摊还是单独核算?跨国公司区位投资决策的税收扭曲

R. Ortmann, Erich Pummerer
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引用次数: 3

摘要

我们考察了哪一种税收分配制度在区位投资决策方面导致了更严重的扭曲。我们考虑单独核算(SA)和公式分摊(FA)。在过去的几年里,这两种制度的影响在欧洲引起了激烈的争论。原因是欧盟成员国正在努力实施一个共同的欧洲税收制度,这将导致从SA到FA的转变。虽然现有的研究主要集中在SA或FA下税收对区位决策的影响,但本文的主要创新之处在于,它比较了两种制度所引起的扭曲程度。我们比较了税前最优投资决策和税后最优投资决策,并从投资资金配置的差异中推断出税收分配制度造成的更严重的扭曲。我们假设跨国集团(MNG)在SA下具有全面的账面收入转移机会。我们发现,对于一个有利可图的投资项目,SA下的投资激励与FA下的投资激励是相反的。在SA下,应尽可能多地投资于高税收国家,而在FA下,应尽可能多地投资于低税收国家。如果从税前角度来看,更大份额的投资资金将投资于一个低税收国家,并且投资是有利可图的,那么在SA下,区位投资决策的扭曲往往比在FA下更为严重。反之,如果最优的税前投资决策需要将大部分资金投资于高税收国家,那么在FA下的区位决策可能会更加扭曲。与通常所说的FA对收入转移不敏感相反,我们发现在欧洲引入基于FA的税收分配制度可能导致经济实质向低税收国家的严重转移。本文的结果对欧洲政策制定者和跨国公司特别感兴趣,因为我们的研究结果可能会促使欧洲跨国公司在面对未来适用税收分配制度的潜在变化时重新评估其最近的区位投资决策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Formula Apportionment or Separate Accounting? Tax-Induced Distortions of Multinationals' Locational Investment Decisions
We examine which tax allocation system leads to more severe distortions with respect to locational investment decisions. We consider separate accounting (SA) and formula apportionment (FA). The effects of both systems have been hotly debated in Europe in the past years. The reason is that the EU Member States are striving to implement a common European tax system that would lead to a switch from SA to FA. While existing studies focus primarily on the impact of taxes on locational decisions under either SA or FA, the main innovation of this paper is that it compares both systems with regard to the level of distortions they induce. We compare the optimal pre-tax investment decision with the optimal after-tax investment decision and infer from the difference in the allocation of investment funds which tax allocation system causes more severe distortions. We assume that the multinational group (MNG) has comprehensive book income shifting opportunities under SA. We find that the investment incentives under SA are opposed to those under FA for a profitable investment project. Whereas under SA as much as possible should be invested in a high-tax country, under FA as much as possible should be invested in a low-tax country. The distortions of locational investment decisions tend to be more severe under SA than under FA if a greater share of investment funds is to be invested in a low-tax country from a pre-tax perspective and the investment is profitable. Vice versa, locational decisions may be more distorted under FA if the optimal pre-tax investment decision requires investing a major share of funds in the high-tax country. In contrast to the often stated insensitivity of FA towards income shifting, we find the introduction of a tax allocation system based on FA in Europe could lead to a severe shift of economic substance to low-tax countries. The results of this paper are of particular interest for European policy makers and MNGs as our findings may induce European MNGs to reassess their recent locational investment decisions in the face of a potential future change in the applied tax allocation system.
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