政治家如何收回成本?印度代议制民主的政治经济学

Subramaniam Chandran
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文探讨了印度代议制政治动态中的政治经济学特征。政治被看作是在民主建立的领域中通过获取和维持权力来提高经济利益。代表制充斥着竞争性的民粹主义。新兴领导人和政党为了应对政治竞争,不得不调整自己的意识形态。选举政治和投票行为反映了政治家提出的一系列影响。选民们已经习惯了期望从国家财政中得到好处。选举竞争对手的投资和回报政策呈现出变化的阶段。每一位选举人都必须在他的任期内花费和实现他的成本。在败选的情况下,甚至连成本回收都不可能直接实现;有一些间接的方法可以收回他们的成本。这一系列的案例研究展示了政党资金、竞选资金、选举支出和成本回收的方法。规章制度不能限制开支水平。政客们过度积累财富的几个案例表明,金钱在选举过程中发挥了重要作用。迄今为止,代议制政治的政治经济学忽略了政治家如何花费和收回成本,并使其财富倍增。当然,获得和维持权力是为了增加选民的财富。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How Do Politicians Recover Their Costs? The Political Economy of Representative Democracy in India
This paper explores the features of political economy in the dynamics of representative politics in India. Politics is seen as enhancing economic benefits through acquiring and maintenance of power in the realm of democratic set up. The system of representation is riddled with competitive populism. Emerging leaders and parties are forced to accommodate their ideologies in coping with competitive politics. Electoral politics and voting behaviour reflect series of influences mooted by the politicians. Voters are accustomed to expect benefits outs of state exchequer. The electoral competitors show a changing phase of investment and return policy. Every elector has to spend and realize his costs in his tenure. In the case of defeated electors, even the cost recovery is not possible directly; there are indirect means to recover their costs. The series of case studies show the method of party funding, campaign financing, electoral expenditure, and cost recovery. Regulations could not restrict the level of spending. Several cases of disproportionate accumulation of wealth by the politicians reveal that money played a major part in electoral process. The political economy of representative politics hitherto ignores how a politician spends and recovers his cost and multiples his wealth. To be sure, the acquiring and maintenance of power is to enhance the wealth of the electors.
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