随机二次纳什与领导-追随者博弈

1980 19th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control including the Symposium on Adaptive Processes Pub Date : 1980-12-01 DOI:10.1109/CDC.1980.271990

G. Papavassilopoulos

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引用次数: 2

摘要

在本文中，我们研究并完全解决了静态纳什和领导者-追随者博弈，其中参与者具有二次代价和线性测量随机变量，该随机变量线性地进入成本，见(1)-(7)。静态公式中包括几种动态情况，只要对参与者的信息施加适当的嵌套条件[4]。

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Stochastic quadratic Nash and leader-follower games

In this paper we study and solve completely the static Nash and Leader-Follower games where the players have quadratic costs and linear measurements of a random variable which enters linearly into the costs, see (1)- (7). Several dynamic cases are included in the static formulation as long as appropriate nestedness conditions [4] are imposed on the information of the players.

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1980 19th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control including the Symposium on Adaptive Processes

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